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Abstract 
 
This study builds a simultaneous equation model that establishes inter-connections among the 
measures of globalization, measures of democracy, human development, corruption perception index 
and per capita income, which in turn jointly influence social progress. The model has eleven 
equations in which the response variables and the predictor variables are log-linearly related.   The 
empirical data used for estimation of the model pertain to the period 2006-2016 for 116 countries 
distributed over all the continents. The model has been estimated by the conventional Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2-SLS) and alternatively by a modified 2-SLS in which, at the second stage, Shapley 
value regression has been used to ameliorate the detrimental effects of collinearity among the 
predictor variables. It has been found that the modified 2-SLS outperforms the conventional 2-SLS. 
Empirically, it has been established that globalization, democracy, human development and low level 
of corruption are reinforcing each other and they together explain social progress quite well. 
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1. Introduction:  
This study investigates into the debated inter-relationships among globalization, political 
regimes, corruption, human development and social progress in a simultaneous model framework. It 
recognizes that a school of scholars holds that globalization and democracy uphold each other and 
they jointly hold back corruption, endorse human development and finally promote social progress. 
Globalization also positively responds to democratic practices, human development and strong 
social capital.  Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the opponent school of scholars relate 
globalization to limiting the scope of democracy, promoting corruption, misaligning human and non-
human capital with globalization sponsored development and consequently thwarting social 
progress. In what follows, an attempt has been made to put together the views and most important 
empirical findings of various scholars and drawing upon the same build as well as estimate a 
simultaneous equation model that may reveal the structural relationships among the said variables.   
2. A Literature Survey on Relationships among Globalization with other Socio-economic Variables 
 In this section we put together the views and empirical findings of various scholars on the 
relationship between globalization, political regime, human capital, social capital and social progress 
as visualized by Stiglitz et al. (2009) and Social Progress Imperative. Human capital is summarily 
measured by the human development index and corruption perception index has been used as a 
prototype measure of social capital. 
2.1. Relationship between Globalization and Political Regime 
Numerous studies have been carried out to investigate into the relationship between regime 
type (democracy to authoritarian) and globalization with the causal arrow indicating towards either 
direction. A good number of studies investigate into the relationship between regime type and 
development (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) that cluster around the Lee thesis and in view of 
globalization being considered as a means to development have a discernible bearing on the 
relationship between regime type and globalization. Among such studies, Huntington and Jorge 
(1975), Marsh (1979), Weede (1983),  Landau (1986), Kohli (1986) and Helliwell (1992) provide 
empirical evidences that indicate negative to inconsequential impact of democracy (or positive to 
insignificant impact of authoritarianism) on development. On the contrary, Dick (1974),  Kormendi 
and  Meguire (1985), Pourgerami (1988), Scully (1988; 1992), Barro (1989),  Pourgerami (1991), 
Remmer (1990), Leblang (1997), Halperin et al. (2005) and Knutsen (2008a; 2008b; 2010)  provide 
empirical evidences of a favourable impact of democracy (or unfavourable impact of  
authoritarianism) on development.  A number of studies assert that there is no direct relationship 
between regime type and development. There are intermediate factors such as the (already) 
attained development  level (Przeworski, 1966; Adelman and Morris, 1967),  type (whether 
bureaucratic or traditional) of authoritarian regime (Sloan and Tedin, 1987), attributes and 
inclination of the authoritarian ruler (Barro, 1997), regional factors with the historical, institutional, 
cultural and geographic specificities that vary over the continents (Grier and Tullock, 1989), degree 
of entrenchment of the political elite class and political competition that they face (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006a), etc  that modify the relationship between regime type and development and, 
therefore, one cannot relate them unconditionally. A number of empirical studies establish 
connection between the regime type and the factors determining development. Boix (2003) and 
Knutsen (2007) found a positive impact of democracy on rule of law and consequentially the 
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protection of property rights. Knutsen (2008b) and Hegre and Fjelde (2008) found that democratic 
governments perform better on control of corruption. Rodrik (1998) found that democracy helps 
increase real wages of workers leading to increase in consumption, which may have efficiency-
promoting effects leading to development (Myrdal ,1972: p. 54). Sen (1999) stresses on freedom and 
social progress, rather than economic development, and favours democracy for that reason. 
A number of studies assess the impact of trade and development on the regime type 
(especially democratization). Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960) hold that free trade 
and capital flows foster demands for democracy via (and also in favour of) enhancement of the 
efficiency of resource allocation and consequent economic development. Eichengreen and Lebang 
(2006) find a bi-directional causality that mutually reinforce democracy and globalization. Kollias and 
Paleologou (2016) find a positive impact of globalization on democracy, although it is not true for 
the countries of all income groups. Globalization hardly promotes democracy in poor economies. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) shows that key democratizing forces associated with trade 
openness depend on country’s relative factor endowment. Rudra (2005) observes that economic 
globalization leads to improvements in democracy only if safety nets are used simultaneously as a 
strategy for providing stability and building political support.  Milner and Mukherjee (2009) find that 
democracy fosters trade and capital account liberalization, but not all the aspects of globalization. Li 
and Reuveny (2003) find that different constituents of globalization affect democracy in different 
manner not conformal to each other. Haffoudhi and Bellakhal (2016) find that the efforts of 
globalization in poor countries suffering from famines, chronic under-nutrition, poor state of human 
development, low efficiency and poor state of resource allocation would not promote democracy.   
 
There are a number of studies that point out undesirable effects of globalization on the 
political sphere of less developed countries. Schwartzman (1998) observes that globalization and 
democracy reinforce each other to facilitate the fulfilment of the interest of the dominant world 
economic system. Sobhan (2003) observes that the countries with weak democratic institutions and 
undiversified or externally dependent economies are often exploited. Turyahikayo (2014) observes 
that globalization has been used as a tool by the established democracies/economies for 
exploitation of cheap labour and dumping the industrial waste in poor countries. Steiner (2015) 
observes that globalization may have a negative effect on public participation in the political domain.   
Stein (2016) opines that a sovereign state system, democratic governments, and an integrated global 
marketplace cannot coexist. It is most likely therefore that globalization will affect the sovereignty of 
less developed countries adversely.  
 
2.2. Relationship between Globalization and Non-Material Capital 
 
Scholars are divided on the relationship of globalization with human development. 
Sirageldin (2002) recognises the complex character of human development which is an outcome of 
the historical process of symbolic cultural evolution. Globalization with fits and starts that moves 
with the oscillatory forces of the international economy cannot uphold human development. 
Globalization has affected the education sector to turn against the poor. The Human Development 
Report 1999 tooke note of the adverse consequences of unregulated globalization on human 
development and recommended stronger global governance (Naqvi, 2002).  Rabbanee et al. (2010) 
observe that while globalisation has often gone along with privatization and reduction of 
government help to the poor, it affects human development adversely. Diametrically opposite to 
this, Sapkota (2011) studies a large number of countries and finds that all components of 
globalization (economic, social and political) have positive and statistically significant effect on 
human development.  
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Huynen et al. (2005) analyse various pathways in which globalization may affect public 
health (an important ingredient of human development) and highlights the need to regulate the 
impacts of globalization so that they do not go against public health. Globalization idealizes and 
romanticizes “the private”, while the bureau-professional regime of public welfare provision is 
consistently and unthinkingly demonised (Ball, 2005). Yang (2006) points out that the privatization 
“movement has profound implications, from primary schools to universities. Its impact is particularly 
damaging to education in countries with a substantial population of poor people.  ... Tragic stories 
often make headlines in the press regarding the despair of working parents that they can never 
afford to pay their child’s education fees.” In China, India and many other less developed countries 
where a rapid transition is undergoing from free education to a fee-based system, it takes a heavy 
toll on poor families, of whom many see education as their only way out of poverty. As Lake and 
Baum (2001) point out, democracy is often instrumental in looking into the interest of the weaker 
section through public provisioning. Globalization may affect government aided public provisioning 
and affect social welfare, especially of the deprived class, adversely.   
 
There are many research studies that observe the impact of globalization on human 
development conditional or partial. Sabi (2007) finds that impact of globalization on human 
development is not appreciable in developing countries at low or low-middle income groups. 
Globalization may be important for human development only after certain level of income growth. 
Figueroa (2014) finds that in Central and South American countries overall globalization as well as 
social and political components of it has positive effect, but economic globalization has a negative 
effect on human development. Asongu (2012) studies African countries and finds that while trade 
globalization improves human development, financial globalization has the opposite effect.  Lee and 
Vivarelli (2006) hold that levels of economic and human development are crucially important to 
determine the direction and the scope to globalization forces. Bottlenecks in the supply of educated 
and skilled labour and in public and private investments may condemn a country to marginalisation, 
exploitation and high levels of domestic unemployment and income inequality. 
Along with the human capital, the social capital is crucially important for development. 
Social capital (Durkheim, 1997) is made up of “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social 
intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit … potentiality 
sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community.” (Hanifan, 
1916; pp. 130-131). Social capital not only generates internal economies, it also attracts material 
capital from abroad and helps in globalization. In this study we use ‘corruption’ as a prototype to 
represent social capital. It is well acknowledged that corruption and malpractices erode away social 
capital and discourage inflow of foreign  capital while a strong legal framework to check corruption 
enhances the inflow of foreign capital (Bayer and Alakbarov, 2016).    
Knutsen (2008b) and Hegre and Fjelde (2008) found that democratic governments perform 
better on control of corruption. This control may support globalization. Lalountas et al. (2011) 
observe that globalization is a powerful weapon against corruption only for middle and high income 
countries, while for low income countries globalization has no significant impact on corruption. Das 
and DiRienzo (2009) find a nonlinear relationship between globalization and corruption. The effect 
of globalization on corruption is dependent on the level of globalization. The highest corruption 
levels are realized at moderate or transitioning levels of globalization. 
Globalization has brought government officials and international businesses and trade 
agents into a close relationship and consequentially increased the opportunities for rent-seeking. 
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Eisner (1995), Gould (1991) and Jreisat (1997) argue, therefore, that globalization has increased the 
opportunity of the use of official position for personal gain.  Globalization has also made the 
detection of corrupt practices more difficult (Leiken, 1997;  Elliott, 1997). Ewoh et al. (2013) find that 
while globalization of assets and capital markets has promoted corruption worldwide, it affects 
developing nations negatively more than it impacts advanced countries. Ades and Di Tella (1997; 
1999), Brunetti and Weder (1998), Treisman (2000) and Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) find that 
globalization leads to reduction in corruption mainly due to openness. Badinger and Nin (2014) find 
that globalisation (trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more 
pronounced in developing countries, while inequalities increase corruption. Golden (2002) found 
that in Italy globalization led to decrease in corruption levels. 
2.3. Relationship between Globalization and Social Progress 
Globalization necessarily favours a market-based economy because it means economic 
integration of economies through markets. Economic liberalism is its guiding spirit and it is assumed 
that unrestricted self-interest would bring about the best material results. However, as Keynes 
(1926) observed long back, it is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that 
enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest 
generally is enlightened. Unrestricted self-interest can be operational only if the society has 
developed and internalized a strong sense of social obligation because morality of the minimum 
order is necessary for the functioning of the market system. Further, it requires a mixed-economy 
framework because market capitalism has never been the basis of political economy in any country, 
at any time (Hirsch, 1977: p. 190; Naqvi, 2002).  Singer (1950) argues that structural differences 
between developed and developing economies interacting with each other on market principles may 
introduce a systemic bias in which trans-border trade and investment hinder the growth-promoting 
process of structural transformation in the developing economy. Streeten (1998) shows how 
globalization has posed a threat to developing countries by arousing several kinds of social tensions 
leading to  impoverishment, inequalities, work insecurity, a weakening of institutions and social-
support systems and an erosion of established identities and values (Naqvi, 2002). As Stiglitz et al. 
(2009) have pointed out globalization (in the way it has proceeded) has contributed to the 
weakening of a sense of community. Moreover, globalization is a market-based concept. The 
correspondence between market-based concepts and non-market based concepts is not yet well 
established, but it is important to understand more fully the links between various measures of 
market and non-market activities and of leisure and the quality-of-life metrics such as the social 
progress index. Empirically, it has been found that the social progress index responds positively to 
globalization index (Mishra, 2017).  
From the literature cited above, it is understandable that there is no direct relationship 
among globalization, political regimes, corruption, human development and social progress; they are 
related with each other through a complex network of institutions, historical precedents, resource 
endowments, socio-economic class structure and a host of other country-specific attributes. 
However, when such relationships are investigated for a large number of countries together, the 
country-specific attributes may be cancelled out to a large extents and some clear pattern might be 
discernible. The present investigation begins with such an optimistic presupposition.     
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3. A Simultaneous Equation Model of Globalization, Non-material Capital, Regime Type and Social 
Progress 
In the light of the literature cited above as well as the reasoning that guides an empirical 
research in economics, the present study hypothesizes a bi-directional causal relationship between 
the two sets of variables; the first set incorporating the measures of (economic, social and political) 
globalization and the second set consisting of the measures of democracy (political regime type) and 
the measures of non-material capital (human development as a measure of human capital and 
corruption perception as a measure of social capital).  Additionally, the measures of globalization 
and the measures of non-material capital are directly or indirectly influenced by the economic 
prosperity of a country (summarily measured by per capita income). Finally, it is visualized that social 
progress (which is a more comprehensive or wider concept encompassing economic development  
and welfare and is summarily measures by the social progress index) is influenced by globalization 
(especially the trans-border flow of goods, services and information), non-material capital, political 
regime type as well as economic development (represented by per capita income). Alternatively, 
economic development (as measured by per capita income) could be substituted for social progress 
but in our considered opinion the latter is the output of the former (if moving on the right track) 
and, therefore, it is a preferred choice.  The model does not include other variables (such as physical 
and financial capital) explicitly since it assumes that per capita income and the level of human 
development incorporate them indirectly.  Similarly, institutions are indirectly represented by 
political regime and corruption perception index. 
The model is schematically presented below. It is a system of eleven structural equations of 
which the first ten make three stimulator and/or moderator blocks while the last one (the eleventh 
equation) makes the fourth or final impact or response block. The first three blocks formulate how 
the different aspects of globalization are self-concordant and how they are influenced by non-
material capital (human and social capital), political organization and economic performance (per 
capita income) of a nation.  Per capita income is a stimulant to globalization. Globalization and the 
measures in the third block (non-material capital and political regime) are mediator or moderators. 
They conceptualize how different aspects of globalization influence as well as are influenced by non-
material capital and political organization. The fourth block formulates how globalization, non-
material (human and social) capital, political regime and economic development influence the 
overall social welfare or social progress of a nation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The eleven structural equations of the model are presented below. Functional form-wise, it is 
visualized that the relationships among the variables are linear in logarithm or log = log 	
 +
∑ 	 log , where  is a response variable,  is a stimulus, predictor or explanatory variable, 
Block-2  
Three Aspects of Globalization 
Economic, Social, Political. 
Six measures (in all) 
Economic – E1 and E2 
Social – S1, S2 and S3 
Political – P 
Composite Globalization 
 Index - GI  
Block-3: 
Non-material Capital (Human, HD and Social, CP); 
Socially Responsive Political System (Democracy 
Index, DI) 
 
Block-4 
Social Welfare (Social Progress, SP) 
 
Block-1 
Economic Development (Per Capita Income) 
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 is a constant and 	 is the coefficient (which may also be interpreted as a measure of elasticity of 
 with respect to ). 
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                                                                !. 06 
/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 = 1, 2 , 1, 2, 3,                                                                      !. 08 
2 = 1, 2, 3                                                                                           !. 09 
)/
 = 
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, 
, /
                                                                        !. 10 
 = &/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In a simultaneous equation framework, it is customary to classify the variables as (1) 
endogenous and (2) exogenous (or pre-determined). The endogenous variables are those that have 
been a response variable anywhere in the model while the exogenous variables are those that have 
not been endogenous (response variable) anywhere in the model. In a dynamic framework, the 
endogenous variables are of two types (i) current endogenous and (ii) lagged (prior in time) 
endogenous. In the context of a particular equation, the lagged endogenous variables are called 
predetermined variables and are treated similar to exogenous variables.  
The lists of endogenous and predetermined/exogenous variables are presented below. 
Endogenous Variables 
Sl. No. 
Symbol Socio-Economic  and  
political Aspects 
Description 
1 E1  Economic Globalization 
Max or Min (2006-14) 
Actual economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct 
investment and portfolio investment. 
2 E2  Economic Globalization 
Max or Min (2006-14) 
Relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital 
movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc. 
3 S1  Social Globalization 
Max or Min (2006-14) 
Trans-border personal contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom 
traffic, postal interactions, etc. 
4 S2  Social Globalization 
Max or Min (2006-14) 
Flow of information. 
5 S3  Social Globalization 
Max or Min (2006-14) 
Cultural proximity. 
6 P  Political Globalization 
Max or Min (2006-14) 
Trans-national political set up. 
7 DI16 Political Regime Democracy Index for 2016. 
8 CP16 Social Capital Corruption Perception index for 2016. 
9 HD15 Human Development Human Development Index for 2015. 
10 GI10 Overall Globalization Max (2006-2014) or Min (2006-2014) 
11 SP16 Social Progress Social Progress Index for 2016. 
   
Exogenous/Predetermined Variables 
Sl. No. Symbol Socio-Economic  and  
political Aspects 
Description 
1 EPP06 Measure of Democratic Practices Electoral Process and Pluralism for 2006. 
2 FOG06 Measure of Democratic Practices Functioning of Government for 2006. 
3 PPN06  Measure of Democratic Practices Political Participation for 2006. 
4 PCL06 Measure of Democratic Practices Political Culture for 2006. 
5 CVL06 Measure of Democratic Practices Civil Liberties   for 2006. 
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6 CP06 Social Capital Corruption Perception index for 2006. 
7 HD06 Human Development Human Development Index for 2005. 
8 PCY06 Per Capita Income  Per capita Income (in Int$1000) for  2006                                                                                                                           
9 DI06 Overall Measure of Democracy  Overall Democracy Index for 2006 
  
4. Data or the Measures Used in this Study 
 
In this study we have drawn 116 countries from all the continents including Africa (38 
countries), the Americas (23 countries), Asia (26 countries), Europe (26 countries) and Oceania (3). 
These countries together represent all types of political regime (full democracy to authoritarian), all 
levels of globalization (very low, to very high) and all levels of economic development, social 
progress, human capital and social capital. The data used by us are presented in the appendix (Table-
A-1, Table-A-2, and Table-A-4). 
In Table-A-1 we present five measures for democracy (EPPi06, FOGi06, PPNi06, PCLi06, CVLi06 and 
DI06; i=1 through 116) for the year 2006 as well as the overall measure of democracy DI16 for 2016. In 
Table-A.2 we present corruption perception Index, human development Index and also the overall 
democracy index for 2006 and 2016. Table-A-2 also contains Social Progress Index (2016), Per Capita 
Income (2015 – in Int$1000) and overall Globalization Indices scenario-wise (GImax and GImin, 
explained below). In Table-A-3 and Table-A-4 we present aspect-wise sub-indices as well as overall 
globalization indices for the two alternative (optimistic and pessimistic) scenarios explained below.   
4.1. Measures of Different Aspects of Globalization with Two Scenarios 
As it has been pointed out earlier, KOF(2017) visualizes three complementary aspects of 
globalization: economic, social and political. They construct indices to measure each of these aspects 
of globalization. They are sub-indices in the sense that merged together they provide the overall 
index of globalization.  We have used those KOF sub-indices for the period 2006-2014 (KOF, 2017). 
However, the measure of overall globalization ()/10) is not that of KOF (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 
2008). We have used the AEMC overall index (Mishra, 2016b) of globalization using the ‘almost equi-
marginal contribution principle’ that derives weights differently than KOF (which uses the principal 
component analysis for constructing the overall index of globalization).  By the way, the KOF and 
AEMC indices of overall globalization are highly correlated (r=0.98). The AEMC index, which we 
would denote by G, is for 9 years (2006-2014) and 116 countries, i.e. )4,; 6 = 1,2, … ,116; 8 =
2006,2007, … ,2014. 
On the basis of our AEMC index of overall globalization, we have formed two scenarios, the 
one we call a pessimistic scenario and the other an optimistic scenario. It may be noted that for 
every Gij we have the associated sub-indices [E1ij, E2ij, S1ij, S2ij, S3ij and Pij]; j=2006 through 2014 and 
i=1,2,..., 116. We have constructed a scenario vector:  
1        914
4:,  24
4:,  14
4:, 24
4:, 34
4:, 4
4:;  
which is associated with 
)4
4: = min
?
&GA?;?∈ CD

,D
EF +,   where i = 1, 2, … , 116 
that gives us the set of values associated with the lowest extent of globalization experienced by any 
country during 2006-2014. This gives us the pessimistic scenario (associated with )4:). 
Similarly, we have constructed the other scenario vector: 
2        C14
KL,  24
KL,  14
KL, 24
KL, 34
KL, 4
KLF  
which is associated with 
)4
KL = max
?
&GA?;?∈ CD

,D
EF +,   where i = 1, 2, … , 116 
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that gives us the set of values associated with the highest extent of globalization experienced by any 
country during 2006-2014.  This gives us the optimistic scenario (associated with )KL). 
We have these two scenario vectors of globalization as our endogenous variables (along 
with other endogenous variables) for estimation of our model. These scenarios influence and are 
also influenced by other variables such as the measures of democracy, human and social capital, the 
social progress, etc.   
 
4.2. The Measures of Non-Material Capital 
Socio-economic development is squarely based on availability of capital, which may be 
material (physical and financial) and non-material. Role of material capital in promoting 
development need not be overemphasized here. Yet, the role of non-material capital, which consists 
of human and social capital, must be outlined. Human capital is made of the health and the skill 
embodied in the people of a country. It is a determinant of labour productivity that not only helps 
socio-economic development but also facilitates globalization. A comprehensive measure of human 
capital is provided by the human development index which incorporates some basic measures of 
health and education of the people of a country. This measure is provided by. Similarly, a prototype 
measure of social capital is provided by the corruption perception index.   
4.3. The Measures of Democracy 
 
Political structure of a country that necessarily divides the political agents into two classes, 
the governor (ruler) and the governed (subject), may have in-built mechanism to respond to each 
other such that they function in coordination with each other in order to cater to the lofty ideals of a 
civilized society ensuring law and order, protection of life and property, rule of law, justice, freedom 
of different types given to the citizens including a scope to alter the governing agents or the 
administrative system according to some rules and some procedure of doing so, transparency, 
participation, enhancement of social capital, an environment for realization of potentialities of the 
society and so on.   One may classify the political regimes on the basis of meeting these criteria. Fully 
democratic regimes provide opportunities to the subject to alter members of the government in 
pursuance to ensure that they are better fit to meet the ideals while autocratic or authoritarian 
regimes do not provide such scope.  The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) of the Economist Group 
has published the Democracy Index for 2006 onwards for several years, including 2016. The index is 
based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories namely, Electoral process and pluralism 
(EPP), Functioning of government (FOG), Political participation (PPN), Political culture (PCL) and Civil 
liberties (CVL), and a linear aggregation of indicators under each category provides a sub-index of 
democracy in that category or aspect. Subsequently, these five sub-indices of different aspects of 
democracy are linearly aggregated to yield an overall index (DI or the Index of Democracy).  On the 
basis of the overall score value of DI the political systems of different countries may be classified into 
full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. In the present 
study we have used the aspect-wise sub-indices for 2006 and the overall indices of democracy (DI) 
for 2006 and 2016. 
 
4.4. The Measures of Economic Development and Social Progress 
 
Per capita income is a standard measure of productivity and level of economic activities of a 
country as well as it represents the mean level of purchasing power of a representative individual 
agent. Higher per capita income is likely to support higher per capita consumption expenditure 
encouraging trade and globalization. Higher per capita income is also associated with higher 
domestic savings and investment. Yet, per capita income may not be a good measure of real social 
progress or social welfare. Social Progress Imperative, an international organization, has been 
constructing every year the social progress index for a large number of countries. The index 
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measures the extent to which countries cover social and environmental needs of its citizenry. It is 
constructed by aggregating a large number of indicators covering three areas or dimensions - basic 
human needs, foundations of wellbeing and opportunities. This index is considered as an output of a 
right type of economic progress and does not incorporate the economic variables (such as income) 
into it. It can work very well as a measure complementing per capita income. In our model per capita 
income has been considered as an input variable while the social progress index has been 
considered as an output variable. 
  
5. Methodological Aspects of Estimation of the Model 
 
To estimate the parameters (of the structural equations) in our model we have used Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2-SLS) method. This method estimates the equations (of a simultaneous equation 
model) one by one - without a necessity of any sequence to be followed.  At the first stage, all 
endogenous variables are subjected to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation procedure in which 
all exogenous variables are used as predictor or explanatory variables. Expected vectors of all 
endogenous variables are obtained. At the second stage, these expected vectors are used in place of 
their original vectors wherever any of them is a predictor. Thus, the predicted vectors of 
endogenous variables are used as their representatives or ‘instruments’. Notably, the original 
endogenous variable is used as the response variable or ‘regressand’ in every equation.  Since in O = 
 − Q RST (where  is the observed endogenous variable, O is expected value,  RST is the residual 
obtained at the first stage) Q = 1,  the 2-SLS is also called the Q-UVWXX  XY6ZWY[\ for Q = 1.  The 2-
SLS is easy to apply and free from the undesirable effects of misspecification of other equations in 
the model. Since in this study little is known about correct specification of different equations in our 
model, we have used the 2-SLS method of estimation. It has an added advantage that it uses the 
instrumental variable method of estimation (Reiersøl, 1945) in a very natural manner. 
However, it may be noted that the very procedure adopted by the 2-SLS  - that at the second 
stage it uses the linear function of all exogenous variables together with some exogenous variables 
(explicitly) as predictors -  renders it susceptible to collinearity.  Collinearity among the predictor 
variables has deleterious effects on the standard errors of the estimated parameters. At times, the 
sign borne by an estimated coefficient may be wrong (Smith and Brainard, 1976). To ameliorate the 
obnoxious effects of collinearity, we have used the Shapley value regression (Lipovetsky, 2006; 
Mishra, 2016a) at the second stage of the 2-SLS. Optimization has been done by the Differential 
Evolution method of global optimization (Storn and Price, 1997). 
 
6. Main Findings  
 
In what follows, we present our main findings of estimation of our model for both 
alternative scenarios of globalization with the conventional as well as Shapley value based 2-SLS.  As 
mentioned earlier, the use of Shapley value regression to estimate the parameters of our model is 
motivated by the presence of strong collinearity among the predictor variables that may not only 
render the coefficients estimated by conventional 2-SLS statistically insignificant, they also may bear 
incorrect  sign. Our empirical findings presented in the next section corroborate to this concern. 
 
It may also be a matter to interest to inquire the relative performance of Shapley-value 
based 2-SLS vis-à-vis the conventional 2-SLS in explaining different endogenous (response) variables. 
We have presented correlation matrices in appendix Table-A-7 (pessimistic globalization scenario) 
and Table-A-8 (optimistic globalization scenario). The correlation coefficients are: \4 = \4 , ]^, 
where 4  is the 6_  observed endogenous variable and ]^  is the 8_ endogenous variable estimated 
by conventional 2-SLS. By the way,  \4,4
D  = \D4,`^  ) is the usual aD or the coefficient of determination 
that one reports in the regression results. Similarly, \4 = \&4 , ]b +,  where 4  is the 6_  observed 
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endogenous variable and ]b   is the 8_ endogenous variable estimated by Shapley value regression 
based 2-SLS. The coefficient of correlation between conventional 2-SLS estimated endogenous 
variable and Shapley value regression based 2-SLS is   \4= \`^ , ]b ). A large value of \`^ , `b ) indicates 
that the correlation between the conventional 2-SLS predicted and Shapley value regression based 
2-SLS predicted vectors (of the same endogenous variable) is large or, in other words, the 
conventional 2-SLS and Shapley value regression based 2-SLS are highly conformal. Throughout we 
find (Panel-3) that  \44= \`^ , `b ) is large for all endogenous variables. Further, \4 , `^  and \4 , `b  
are very close to each other for all endogenous variables, although the latter is somewhat smaller 
than the former. This is the cost that we must pay to circumvent the deleterious effects of 
collinearity. These results confirm that Shapley value regression based 2-SLS will not mislead us.  
 
6.1. Estimated Structural Equations for the Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization  
 
The reduced form coefficients for the pessimistic scenario of globalization are presented in 
appendix Table-A-5. Here we will discuss the estimated structural equation coefficients only. First of 
all we present the results obtained by estimating the model by the conventional 2-SLS.   Figures in 
the  2nd row are standard error of estimates.  
 
Structural Equation Coefficients based on Conventional 2-SLS    
 
E1 =   0.0867E2   -  0.1246S1    -  0.1520PCL06   +   0.1721CP06 +   0.6295HD06   +  0.0946PCY06  +  1.1074 ; R
2
= 0.5338 
          [0.4416            0.3006           0.1338                   0.2098              0.4074                  0.0851                  0.8696] 
 
E2 =  -1.6849S2  +  0.0748S3  +  0.4677P  +  0.0223EPP06  -  0.0423PPN06  + 0.1577CP06  +  1.8505HD06  + 0.5884 ; R
2
= 0.6266 
          [0.6781           0.0721          0.3723         0.0205               0.0530                  0.0755                0.5959               1.7255]  
 
S1 =  -1.2730E1  +  0.2712S3 -  0.1795FOG06  -  0.1008PCL06  -  0.0246CVL06  + 0.6649CP06  +  1.2937HD06   + 1.4017 ; R
2
= 0.6794 
          [0.6973           0.1288         0.0694                 0.1731                0.1143                 0.1766               0.5043                1.8460] 
 
S2 = -0.3332E2  +  0.0021PPN06  +  0.0284PCL06  +  0.0588CVL06 +  0.9389HD06   +  0.0659PCY06  +   0.9355 ; R
2
= 0.8341 
         [0.1968           0.0224                  0.0587                 0.0387                0.1590                 0.0274                   0.4344] 
 
S3 =    4.2123P  -  1.3758PCL06 +  0.9656CP06   +  2.1926HD06  -  22.0713 ; R
2
= 0.6902 
          [1.0359        0.4660                0.3107                 0.4750               2.8674] 
 
P  =   -0.5449E1  +  0.2950E2  -  0.1128S1  + 0.2904S2  + 0.0653S3  +  0.0756PCY06  +  3.9656 ; R
2
= 0.2035 
          [0.2997          0.3903          0.1904          0.3470         0.1179          0.1131                  1.2918]        
 
DI16 = 1.7965E2  + 0.0748S1   -  0.9651S2  -  0.0911S3 +  1.8591P -  7.1053 ; R
2
= 0.7815 
            [0.2541         0.1214           0.2408         0.0689          0.2439      1.3829] 
 
CP16 =  -0.1142E1  + 1.3943E2  +  1.0962S1   -  1.5450S2  -  0.1005S3  +  0.4666P   -  0.7490 ; R
2
= 0.7966 
              [0.2737          0.2621           0.1197           0.2829         0.0724           0.2852        1.5387]  
 
HD15 =  0.1109E1 +  0.8247S2 -  0.0205S3   -  1.8695 ; R
2
= 0.9658 
              [0.0533          0.0598         0.0119          0.1799] 
 
GI10   = 0.1028CP06  +  0.2957HD06   +  0.1003PCY06  +  0.0802DI06  +  1.7130 ; R
2
= 0.8485 
              [0.0452               0.0897                 0.0257                 0.0349               0.3057] 
 
SP15   =  0.0916DI16  +  0.0792CP16  +   0.5984HD15  +  0.0646GI10  +  0.0083PCY06   + 2.0611 ; R
2
= 0.9407 
                [0.0290               0.0456                 0.1091               0.2180               0.0250                  0.4869] 
 
We observe that in explaining E1 (Actual economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct 
investment and portfolio investment) most of the predictor variables bear statistically insignificant 
coefficients. The coefficients that are not statistically different from zero even at 10% level of 
significance have been underlined. Only HD06 (human development index) has the coefficient 
significantly different from zero at 10% significance. Relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade 
as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc (E2) has a negative coefficient 
(significant at 5%) associated with S2 (flow of information) which is not expected. Similarly, effects of 
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trans-border trade, flow of finance etc (E1) and functioning of the government (FOG) affect S1 
(trans-border personal contacts) adversely, which is contrary to expectation. Flow of information 
(S2) is adversely affected by relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade and capital movement 
(E2), cultural proximity (S3) is adversely affected by political culture (PCL), political aspect of 
globalization (P) is adversely influenced by trans-border flow of goods, services and capital (E1) and 
so on which are contrary to expectation.  In short, the conventional 2-SLS gives the results that are 
unexpected or contrary to expectation. 
 
However, the structural coefficients associated with all predictor variables estimated by the 
Shapley value based 2-SLS (presented below) are positive as expected and except for a few (viz. FOG 
in predicting S1 and PPN in predicting S2) all others are significant at 5% or less (1% or even 0.1%). 
None of the coefficients is statistically insignificant (beyond 10% level of significance). It may be 
noted that for the coefficients (estimated structural parameters) of the Shapley value regression, 
there is no straightforward method to obtain standard error of estimate and, therefore, Student’s t 
values, too, which may be used for testing the maintained hypothesis.  Hence, in this study, the 
standard error of estimates (row 2 for every equation) for the estimated structural parameters 
obtained by Shapley value regression have been worked out by jackknife resampling and the 
associated t values (row 3 for every equation) are based on those standard error of estimates. 
 
Structural Equation Coefficients based on Shapley Value Regression based  2-SLS  
 
E1 =     0.2191E2    +    0.1069S1    +  0.1011PCL06   +  0.0968CP06  +   0.2062HD06    +    0.0456PCY06     -    3.0655;  R
2
=0.5031 
              (0.0333)           (0.0116)              (0.0198)              (0.0114)                 (0.0324)               (0.0077)             (0.3093) 
           6.59(0.01%)      9.23(0.01%)      5.10(0.01%)        8.50(0.01%)        6.36(0.01%)           5.88(0.01%)     -9.91(0.01%)    
 
E2 =   0.1769S2     +      0.0412S3     +   0.2695P   +   0.0105EPP06 +  0.0295PPN06 + 0.0942CP06 + 0.1881HD06    -  3.2541;  R
2
=0.5866 
              (0.0182)               (0.0051)           (0.0448)             (0.0064)               (0.0138)            (0.0154)        (0.0243)        (0.2807) 
           9.70(0.01%)      8.14(0.01%)      6.01(0.01%)        1.65(5%)           2.14(2.5%)     6.10(0.01%)    7.75(0.01%)  -1.59(0.01%)    
 
S1 =    0.3116E1   +   0.0804S3    +   0.0533FOG06  +  0.1877PCL06 + 0.0920CVL06  +  0.2239CP06  +  0.3261HD06  -  4.9740;  R
2
=0.6342 
             (0.0290)          (0.0089)                (0.0325)              (0.0394)              (0.0264)             (0.0269)           (0.0435)         (0.3962) 
         10.76(0.01%)   9.08(0.01%)      1.64(10%)       4.77(0.01%)         3.49(0.01%)        8.31(0.01%)   7.50(0.01%)  -12.55(0.01%)    
 
S2 =      0.2704E2       +   0.0344PPN06   +   0.1143PCL06   +   0.0580CVL06   +   0.2875HD06   +    0.0580PCY06      -  3.3337;  R
2
=0.7787 
                   (0.0204)               (0.0219)               (0.0175)                (0.0165)                 (0.0230)                   (0.0049)          (0.1524) 
               13.26(0.01%)        1.57(10%)            6.52(0.01%)        3.51(0.01%)        12.52(0.01%)       11.87(0.01%)    -21.88(0.01%)    
 
S3 =         2.5375P       +     0.5987PCL06  +   0.6933CP06   +   1.4443HD06      -   21.6822;  R
2
=0.6207 
                    (0.3369)                 (0.1354)              (0.0786)             (0.1631)            (1.4241) 
                 7.53(0.01%)        4.42(0.01%)         8.82(0.01%)          8.86(0.01%)    -15.23(0.01%)    
 
P   =         0.0773E1     +       0.0713E2   +     0.0285S1   +  0.0593S2    + 0.0175S3  +  0.0153PCY06   -   1.0534;  R
2
=0.1630 
                      (0.0293)            (0.0393)           (0.0125)          (0.0305)         (0.0068)            (0.0062)          (0.2313) 
                2.64(0.05%)          1.82(5%)       2.28(2.5%)         1.94(5%)    2.58(0.05%)          2.45(1%)     -4.55(0.01%)    
 
DI16   =  0.3713E2    +     0.0814S1    +     0.1827S2      +    0.0464S3      +    0.7067P          -   5.6630;  R
2
=0.6373 
                 (0.0592)             (0.0209)             (0.0269)             (0.0055)           (0.1237)              (0.5068) 
               6.27(0.01%)      3.90(0.01%)      6.81(0.01%)      8.47(0.01%)      5.71(0.01%)    -11.18(0.01%)    
 
CP16   = 0.1368E1      +     0.2605E2      +   0.2023S1     +    0.1936S2      +     0.0388S3     +    0.2510P     -  4.2995;  R
2
=0.6308 
                     (0.0253)             (0.0402)             (0.0262)             (0.0211)             (0.0057)           (0.1077)      (0.5081) 
                5.41(0.01%)       6.48(0.01%)      7.72(0.01%)       9.16(0.01%)      6.85(0.01%)        2.33(1%)   -8.46(0.01%)    
 
HD15  =  0.2646E1      +       0.3106S2    +      0.0612S3         -  2.5089;  R
2
=0.9406 
                     (0.0100)              (0.0095)             (0.0023)           (0.0651) 
               26.33(0.01%)     32.76(0.01%)     26.17(0.01%)    -38.56(0.01%)    
 
GI10   =    0.1523CP06  +    0.2759HD06     +   0.0705PCY06  +  0.1323DI06     -   2.5071;  R
2
=0.8414 
                        (0.0109)             (0.0215)                (0.0047)             (0.0151)           (0.1336) 
                 13.95(0.01%)     12.84(0.01%)        15.13(0.01%)      8.74(0.01%)    - 8.76(0.01%)    
 
SP16   =      0.1063DI16     +   0.1115CP16     +  0.2175HD15    +    0.1997GI10   +    0.0398PCY06      -     2.2223;  R
2
=0.9182 
                         (0.0086)               (0.0057)                 (0.0113)                 (0.0088)                 (0.0017)              (0.0769)   
                    12.40(0.01%)      19.67(0.01%)        19.30(0.01%)          22.78(0.01%)       23.30(0.01%)    -28.90(0.01%)    
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 6.2. Estimated Structural Equations for the Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
 
The reduced form coefficients for the optimistic scenario of globalization are presented in 
appendix Table-A-6. Here we discuss the estimated structural equation coefficients only.  
 
Structural Equation Coefficients based on Conventional 2-SLS  
 
E1 =   -0.2781E2   -  0.1626S1   -  0.2172PCL06  +  0.3275CP06  +  0.5875HD06  +  0.0492PCY06 +  2.9741; R
2
 = 0.3351    
          [0.5333            0.3063          0.1252                 0.1832                0.4848                0.0792                0.8412] 
 
E2 =   -1.0636S2   + 0.0632S3  -  0.0332P  +  0.0012EPP06  +  0.0381PPN06  +  0.1861CP06  +  1.1882HD06  +  2.7324 ; R
2
 = 0.6503 
           [0.5188          0.0546          0.3756        0.0199                  0.0424                  0.0701                0.3899               1.5804] 
 
S1 =   -0.5193E1  +  0.1369S3  -  0.1285FOG06   -  0.0747PCL06  +  0.0942CVL06  +  0.5033CP06  +  0.8058HD06  +  0.7127 ; R
2
 = 0.6901 
           [0.4077           0.0911         0.0599                   0.1658                 0.0892                 0.1611               0.3457               1.8352] 
 
S2 =   -0.2673E2  +  0.0337PPN06  +  0.0005PCL06   -  0.0150CVL06 +  0.7537HD06 +  0.0825PCY06  +  1.7271; R
2
 = 0.8332 
           [0.2195          0.0207                   0.0530                 0.0333                0.1701               0.0246                  0.4198] 
 
S3 =    5.1359P   -  1.4324PCL06 +   0.4062CP06  +  3.0841HD06  -  27.6722 ; R
2
 = 0.6838 
          [1.5817         0.5067                 0.3314                0.4628                4.8116] 
 
P   =    0.0895E1  +   0.4338E2   -  0.1234S1   -  0.1982S2  -  0.0565S3   +  0.1352PCY06  +  3.0562; R
2
 = 0.2201 
           [0.1699           0.3114           0.1898          0.2957          0.0700           0.0814                  1.0815] 
 
DI16  =  1.9196E2  +  0.1973S1   -  1.7623S2  +  0.0592S3  +  1.5784P  -  4.2575; R
2
 = 0.7436 
               [0.2937         0.1685           0.3234          0.0586           0.3065        1.5561] 
 
CP16 =   -0.0461E1  + 1.0973E2  + 1.2227S1 -  1.5718S2  -  0.1300S3  +  0.9546P -  2.3406 ; R
2
 = 0.7624 
                [0.1921          0.2888         0.1670        0.3203          0.0581           0.3031      1.5771] 
 
HD15 =  -0.0358E1  +  0.8084S2 +  0.0307S3  -  1.3796 ; R
2
 = 0.9519 
                [0.0495          0.0640         0.0128          0.2542]  
 
GI10  =   0.1173CP06  +  0.2686HD06  +  0.0756PCY06  + 0.0511DI06  +  2.0800 ; R
2
 = 0.8525 
               [0.0379               0.0752                0.0216                 0.0292              0.2563] 
 
SP16  =  0.0949DI16  + 0.0854CP16  +  0.6199HD15  +  0.0136GI10  +  0.0133PCY06 +  2.1679 ; R
2
 = 0.9407 
                [0.0269             0.0421                0.0824                0.1387              0.0175                 0.3643] 
 
The highlights of the findings based on the structural coefficients estimated by the 
conventional 2-SLS are: (i) political culture (PCL) affects E1 (trans-border trade and flow of capital) 
adversely; (ii) flow of information (s2) affects relaxation of restriction on flow of trans-border trade, 
capital, etc adversely; (iii) functioning of the government (FOG) affects trans-border personal 
contacts (S1) adversely; (iv) political culture (PCL) affects  cultural proximity (S3) adversely;  (v) trans-
border flow of information (S2) affects democracy adversely (DI) and  (vi) trans-border flow of 
information (S2) and cultural proximity (S3) affect corruption perception (CP) adversely. These 
findings are contrary to our expectation and hence misguiding.    
 
However, as in the case of the pessimistic scenario noted earlier, the structural coefficients 
associated with all predictor variables estimated by the Shapley value based 2-SLS (presented below)  
are positive as expected and except one  (EPP in predicting E2)  all others are statistically significant at 
5% (or less) level of significance. None of the structural coefficients is statistically insignificant 
(beyond 10% level of significance). As mentioned before, the standard error of estimates for the 
estimated structural parameters obtained by Shapley value regression have been worked out by 
jackknife resampling and the associated t values are based on the standard error of estimates. 
 
Structural Equation Coefficients based on Shapley Value Regression based  2-SLS  
 
E1 =       0.1288E2    +     0.0677S1     +    0.0687PCL06   +   0.0721CP06    +   0.1092HD06    +   0.0255PCY06      -     1.8740; R
2
 = 0.2994      
               (0.0248)              (0.0126)                (0.0248)              (0.0144)                  (0.0245)        (0.0059)                   (0.2963)     
            5.20(0.01%)      5.36(0.01%)          2.76(0.05%)        5.02(0.01%)           4.46(0.01%)         4.33(0.01%)         -6.33(0.01%)        
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E2 =  0.1805S2   +     0.0356S3   +    0.2978P  +   0.0083EPP06  +  0.0301PPN06 +  0.0889CP06 + 0.1804HD06   - 3.3461; R
2
 = 0.6113 
         (0.0178)               (0.0039)         (0.0368)             (0.0055)               (0.0072)         (0.0127)          (0.0244)          (0.2612)     
     10.13(0.01%)   9.10(0.01%)   8.09(0.01%)           1.51(10%)         4.16(0.01%)     7.00(0.01%)    7.41(0.01%)  -12.81(0.01%)             
 
S1  = 0.3940E1   +    0.0785S3   +   0.0569FOG06 +  0.1825PCL06  + 0.1005CVL06  +  0.2029CP06 + 0.3477HD06  -   5.4161; R
2
 = 0.6548 
         (0.0393)             (0.0087)            (0.0289)                 (0.0306)              (0.0300)            (0.0244)           (0.0474)      (0.3649)     
    10.01(0.01%)     9.02(0.01%)         1.97(2.5%)          5.97(0.01%)       3.35(0.01%)    8.32(0.01%)   7.34(0.01%)   -4.84(0.01%)        
 
S2  =   0.2692E2     +     0.0345PPN06   +    0.1043PCL06    +  0.0450CVL06   +   0.2492HD06   +   0.0542PCY06    -    3.0881; R
2
 = 0.7776 
            (0.0194)                 (0.0105)                 (0.0153)                  (0.0136)                 (0.0197)                 (0.0046)            (0.1474)     
       13.85(0.01%)          3.30(0.01%)           6.83(0.01%)            3.31(0.01%)         12.66(0.01%)         11.85(0.01%)   -0.94(0.01%)        
 
S3  =    2.9327P     +       0.5145PCL06   +    0.6073CP06    +    1.6646HD06      -    23.8201; R
2
 = 0.5998 
           (0.3861)                  (0.1492)                 (0.0741)                    (0.1958)             (1.5784)     
          7.59(0.01%)          3.45(0.01%)          8.19(0.01%)          8.50(0.01%)        -15.09(0.01%)        
 
P  =   0.0650E1       +     0.0730E2     +     0.0327S1     +     0.0570S2    +      0.0121S3    +      0.0168PCY06      -    1.0305; R
2
 = 0.2029 
           (0.0241)               (0.0257)              (0.0059)              (0.0133)             (0.0022)                 (0.0053)               (0.1961)    
       2.70(0.05%)       2.84(0.05%)          5.51(0.01%)       4.28(0.01%)       5.60(0.01%)          3.14(0.01%)       -5.26(0.01%)        
 
DI16 =         0.3937E2      +    0.0954S1     +     0.2359S2      +    0.0411S3     +      0.6754P          -    5.9764; R
2
 = 0.5856 
                      (0.0797)              (0.0226)             (0.0413)              (0.0072)              (0.1306)              (0.6075)    
                 4.94(0.01%)        4.21(0.01%)     5.71(0.01%)          5.70(0.01%)      5.17(0.01%)         -9.84(0.01%)      
 
CP16 =   0.1741E1    +      0.2614E2     +     0.1980S1     +     0.2251S2   +       0.0368S3     +     0.4877P     -      5.6749; R
2
 = 0.6318 
               (0.0470)                 (0.0423)            (0.0272)              (0.0294)              (0.0058)           (0.1417)             (0.6548)    
            3.71(0.01%)        6.17(0.01%)      7.27(0.01%)       7.65(0.01%)          6.33(0.01%)      3.44(0.01%)    -8.67(0.01%)  
 
HD15  =    0.3420E1    +      0.3611S2     +     0.0642S3         -    3.1117; R
2
 = 0.9157 
                   (0.0253)            (0.0129)               (0.0027)              (0.1125)     
             13.50(0.01%)     27.93(0.01%)     24.16(0.01%)    -27.66(0.01%)        
 
GI10  =   0.1333CP06   +     0.2350HD06    +    0.0594PCY06    +    0.1100DI06       -   2.1348; R
2
 = 0.8452 
                   (0.0083)                  (0.0183)                (0.0039)                  (0.0115)             (0.1079)    
             15.99(0.01%)         12.85(0.01%)         15.42(0.01%)          9.56(0.01%)        -19.79(0.01%)        
  
SP16  =     0.1084DI16    +    0.1121CP16    +    0.2258HD15   +     0.2238GI10   +     0.0396PCY06      -    2.3654; R
2
 = 0.9179 
                      (0.0089)                 (0.0056)              (0.0128)                   (0.0111)                (0.0017)                (0.0828) 
                   12.12(0.01%)       19.88(0.01%)       17.70(0.01%)         20.22(0.01%)         23.42(0.01%)     -28.58(0.01%)      
 
6.3. A Summary of the Findings on the Estimated Structural Coefficients  of the Model 
 
To summarize, we find that the structural coefficients of the model (for both the scenarios) 
are poorly estimated by the conventional 2-SLS owing to the collinearity among the predictor 
variable. Once we treat the collinearity problem by using the Shapley value regression (at the second 
stage of 2-SLS) we obtain much better and unambiguous results.  On the ground of the findings  
(based on the Shapley value regression based estimation) we note that FOG in predicting S1 and PPN 
in predicting S2 are weak in the pessimistic scenario while EPP in predicting E2 is weak in the 
optimistic scenario, although their coefficients are positive (but significant only at 10%) . All the 
three are sub-indices of democracy. However, other two sub-indicators of democracy (viz. political 
culture, PCL and civil liberties, CVL) unwaveringly affect the measures of globalization in a positive 
and statistically significant manner. On the other side, globalization affects democracy, social capital, 
human capital and social progress positively and in a statistically significant manner.  
    
6.4. The Sum of Elasticities     
  
The structural equations in our model are all log-linear (or   = 	
 ∏ 
de
  in the natural 
form) and, therefore, 	 may be interpreted as the elasticity of  with respect to . The sum total of 
elasticities (X = ∑ W ) determines the degree of homogeneity of a function. If every  is 
multiplies by a constant (say, f) then  will be multiplies by fT. In the Table-1 below we have 
presented the sum of elasticities for different endogenous variables under the alternative 
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procedures of estimation.  The sum of elasticities for E1, E2, S2, P, HD15, GI10 and SP16 are all below 
unity. A 10% increase (f = 1.1) in the present values of their predictors would give rise to less than 
10% (or fT; 0 < X < 1) increase in the quantity of those endogenous (response) variables. The 
elasticity in case of P and GI are only slightly more than 0.5. However, the value of X for S3, DI and CP 
is greater unity and, therefore,  10% increase in the present values of their predictors would give rise 
to greater than 10% (or fT; X > 1) increase in the quantity of those endogenous (response) variables. 
It suggests that CP is elastic and S3 is hyper-elastic (X > 5). As to S1 the conventional 2-SLS and 
Shapley value based 2-SLS give quite different results. However, in view of better performance of the 
latter, we tend to conclude that S1 is elastic (since X for both the scenarios are greater than unity. 
These results clearly suggest that even if the pace of globalization would be tapering off over time, 
its impacts on trans-border personal connections (S1), acculturation or cultural proximity, 
democratization (DI) and social capital (corruption perception, CP) will continue increasing with 
acceleration. It may suggest that globalization will have more impact on socio-cultural  and political 
spheres than economic sphere.  
 
Table-1. Degree of homogeneity or  Sum of Elasticities (the Structural Coefficients for Each Endogenous Variable) 
Scenario Estimator E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 CP16 HD15 GI10 SP16 
Pessimistic 
Scenario 
Conventional 0.7063 0.8458 0.6519 0.7609 5.9947 0.0686 2.6742 1.1974 0.9151 0.5790 0.8421 
Shapley  0.7757 0.8099 1.2750 0.8226 5.2738 0.2692 1.3885 1.0830 0.6364 0.6310 0.6748 
Optimistic 
Scenario 
Conventional  0.3063 0.3800 0.8177 0.5881 7.1938 0.2804 1.9922 1.5267 0.8033 0.5126 0.8271 
Shapley  0.4720 0.8216 1.3630 0.7564 5.7191 0.2566 1.4415 1.3831 0.7673 0.5377 0.7097 
  
7. Concluding Remarks  
 We began with the vexed and much debated relationships among globalization, political 
regime type, human capital, social capital (especially corruption) and social progress. Among the 
researchers, there are the protagonists of globalization who believe that globalization will help 
democracy, building up of human and social capital and promote social progress. There are 
antagonists of globalization who believe the just opposite. It may often be so that the train of 
thought depends on how one argues and what one believes. Man is not a rational animal but a 
rationalising animal. He can think up a reason for anything he wants to believe. There are empirical 
evidences in favour of both the camps.  Nevertheless, empirical evidences are based on data and 
the methods used to process them for drawing conclusions. Therefore, accuracy of data is as 
important as the correct choice of methods. In matters of the secondary data (especially the country 
level data for a large number of countries) a researcher does not have much choice (even though 
one knows that such data are collected with differently accountable systems). But, the choice of 
analytical methods is well within the reach of a researcher.  
We formulated a simultaneous equation model connecting globalization, political regime 
type, human capital, corruption, per capita income and the social progress index. The specification 
of our model depended partly on the literature review and partly on reasoning.  As to the structural 
equations, we chose the endogenous variables to be connected to the predictor variables in a log-
linear form. We estimated the model by the conventional 2-SLS method. We found that many 
among the estimated parameters in different equations (in the pessimistic as well as the optimistic 
scenario) are either insignificant or bear the sign opposite to what reasoning may be able to uphold. 
They together suggested that globalization forces are non-conformal among themselves as well as 
they are unexpectedly correlated with other variables.  
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We suspected that such unexpected results obtained from the conventional 2-SLS have been 
due to collinearity among the predictor variables in almost all structural equations. Hence, at the 
second stage of the 2-SLS, we used the Shapley value regression to estimate the structural 
parameters. The results were spectacular. All the estimated structural parameters bore the expected 
sign. Additionally, only a few of them were significant at 10% or 5% while most of them were 
significant at 1% level of significance.   
Our findings confirm that globalization measures are consistent and conformal among 
themselves. Globalization positively influences and is influenced by democracy, human development 
and social capital.  Globalization reduces corrupt practices and integrity promotes globalization. 
Finally, democracy, social capital (integrity) human development and globalization affect social 
progress positively. We have also found that trans-border personal connection (S1), cultural 
proximity (S3) democracy (DI) and social capital (CP) are elastic (with the degree of homogeneity 
larger than unity) with respect to their predictors.   
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Appendix 
[Data Used in the Present Study] 
 
Table-A-1. Scores Obtained by Countries on the Measures in Different Dimensions of Democracy 
[Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index] 
SL Country 
Dimensions of Democracy – 2006 
 
Democracy 
Index 2006  
Democracy 
Index 2016  
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL DI06 DI16 
1 Albania 7.33 5.07 4.44 5.63 7.06 5.91 5.91 
2 Argentina 8.75 5.00 5.56 5.63 8.24 6.63 6.96 
3 Australia 10.00 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00 9.09 9.01 
4 Austria 9.58 8.21 7.78 8.75 9.12 8.69 8.41 
5 Azerbaijan 3.08 0.79 3.33 3.75 5.59 3.31 2.65 
6 Burundi 4.42 3.29 3.89 6.25 4.71 4.51 2.40 
7 Belgium 9.58 8.21 6.67 6.88 9.41 8.15 7.77 
8 Benin 6.83 6.43 3.89 6.88 6.76 6.16 5.67 
9 Burkina_Faso 4.00 1.79 2.78 5.63 4.41 3.72 4.70 
10 Bulgaria 9.58 5.71 6.67 5.00 8.53 7.10 7.01 
11 Bolivia 8.33 5.71 4.44 3.75 7.65 5.98 5.63 
12 Brazil 9.58 7.86 4.44 5.63 9.41 7.38 6.90 
13 Bhutan 0.08 4.64 1.11 3.75 3.53 2.62 4.93 
14 Botswana 9.17 7.86 5.00 6.88 9.12 7.60 7.87 
15 C._Afr_Rep 0.42 1.43 1.67 1.88 2.65 1.61 1.61 
16 Canada 9.17 9.64 7.78 8.75 10.00 9.07 9.15 
17 Switzerland 9.58 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71 9.02 9.09 
18 Chile 9.58 8.93 5.00 6.25 9.71 7.89 7.78 
19 China 0.00 4.64 2.78 6.25 1.18 2.97 3.14 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 1.25 2.86 3.33 5.63 3.82 3.38 3.81 
21 Cameroon 0.92 3.21 2.78 5.63 3.82 3.27 3.46 
22 Congo_Rep. 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35 2.76 2.91 
23 Colombia 9.17 4.36 5.00 4.38 9.12 6.40 6.67 
24 Costa_Rica 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41 8.04 7.88 
25 Cyprus 9.17 6.79 6.67 6.25 9.12 7.60 7.65 
26 Germany 9.58 8.57 7.78 8.75 9.41 8.82 8.63 
27 Denmark 10.00 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71 9.52 9.20 
28 Domin_Rep 9.17 4.29 3.33 5.63 8.24 6.13 6.67 
29 Algeria 2.25 2.21 2.22 5.63 3.53 3.17 3.56 
30 Ecuador 7.83 4.29 5.00 3.13 7.94 5.64 5.81 
31 Egypt 2.67 3.64 2.78 6.88 3.53 3.90 3.31 
32 Spain 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.75 9.41 8.34 8.30 
33 Ethiopia 4.00 3.93 5.00 6.25 4.41 4.72 3.60 
34 Finland 10.00 10.00 7.78 8.75 9.71 9.25 9.03 
35 Fiji 6.50 5.21 3.33 5.00 8.24 5.66 5.64 
36 France 9.58 7.50 6.67 7.50 9.12 8.07 7.92 
37 Gabon 0.50 3.21 2.22 5.63 2.06 2.72 3.74 
38 U.K. 9.58 8.57 5.00 8.13 9.12 8.08 8.36 
39 Ghana 7.42 4.64 4.44 4.38 5.88 5.35 6.75 
40 Guinea 1.00 0.79 2.22 3.75 2.35 2.02 3.14 
41 Gambia  4.00 4.64 4.44 5.63 3.24 4.39 2.91 
42 Greece 9.58 7.50 6.67 7.50 9.41 8.13 7.23 
43 Guatemala 8.75 6.79 2.78 4.38 7.65 6.07 5.92 
44 Guyana 8.33 5.36 4.44 4.38 8.24 6.15 6.25 
45 Honduras 8.33 6.43 4.44 5.00 7.06 6.25 5.92 
46 Haiti 5.58 3.64 2.78 2.50 6.47 4.19 4.02 
47 Hungary 9.58 6.79 5.00 6.88 9.41 7.53 6.72 
48 Indonesia 6.92 7.14 5.00 6.25 6.76 6.41 6.97 
49 India 9.58 8.21 5.56 5.63 9.41 7.68 7.81 
50 Ireland 9.58 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00 9.01 9.15 
51 Iceland 10.00 9.64 8.89 10.00 10.00 9.71 9.50 
52 Israel 9.17 6.64 7.78 7.50 5.29 7.28 7.85 
53 Italy 9.17 6.43 6.11 8.13 8.82 7.73 7.98 
54 Jamaica 9.17 7.14 5.00 6.25 9.12 7.34 7.39 
55 Jordan 3.08 3.79 3.89 5.00 3.82 3.92 3.96 
56 Japan 9.17 7.86 5.56 8.75 9.41 8.15 7.99 
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57 Kenya 4.33 4.29 5.56 6.25 5.00 5.08 5.33 
58 Cambodia 5.58 6.07 2.78 5.00 4.41 4.77 4.27 
59 South_Korea  9.58 7.14 7.22 7.50 7.94 7.88 7.92 
60 Kuwait 1.33 4.14 1.11 5.63 3.24 3.09 3.85 
61 Lebanon 7.92 2.36 6.11 6.25 6.47 5.82 4.86 
62 Lesotho 7.92 6.43 4.44 6.25 7.35 6.48 6.59 
63 Luxembourg 10.00 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71 9.10 8.81 
64 Morocco 3.50 3.79 2.78 5.63 3.82 3.90 4.77 
65 Moldova 9.17 4.29 6.11 5.00 7.94 6.50 6.01 
66 Madagascar 5.67 5.71 5.56 6.88 5.29 5.82 5.07 
67 Mexico 8.75 6.07 5.00 5.00 8.53 6.67 6.47 
68 Mali 8.25 5.71 3.89 5.63 6.47 5.99 5.70 
69 Malta 9.17 8.21 6.11 8.75 9.71 8.39 8.39 
70 Myanmar 0.00 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88 1.77 4.20 
71 Montenegro 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.63 7.35 6.57 5.72 
72 Mongolia 9.17 6.07 3.89 5.63 8.24 6.60 6.62 
73 Mauritania 1.83 4.29 2.22 3.13 4.12 3.12 3.96 
74 Mauritius 9.17 8.21 5.00 8.13 9.71 8.04 8.28 
75 Malawi 6.00 5.00 3.89 4.38 5.59 4.97 5.55 
76 Malaysia 6.08 5.71 4.44 7.50 6.18 5.98 6.54 
77 Niger 5.25 1.14 1.67 3.75 5.88 3.54 3.96 
78 Nigeria 3.08 1.86 4.44 4.38 3.82 3.52 4.50 
79 Nicaragua 8.25 5.71 3.33 3.75 7.35 5.68 4.81 
80 Netherlands 9.58 9.29 9.44 10.00 10.00 9.66 8.80 
81 Norway 10.00 9.64 10.00 8.13 10.00 9.55 9.93 
82 Nepal 0.08 3.57 2.22 5.63 5.59 3.42 4.86 
83 New_Zealand 10.00 8.57 8.33 8.13 10.00 9.01 9.26 
84 Pakistan 4.33 5.36 0.56 4.38 5.00 3.92 4.33 
85 Panama 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 8.82 7.35 7.13 
86 Peru 8.75 3.29 5.56 5.00 7.94 6.11 6.65 
87 Philippines 9.17 5.36 5.00 3.75 9.12 6.48 6.94 
88 Poland 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.63 9.12 7.30 6.83 
89 Portugal 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41 8.16 7.86 
90 Paraguay 7.92 5.00 5.00 4.38 8.53 6.16 6.27 
91 Romania 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.00 8.53 7.06 6.62 
92 Rwanda 3.00 3.57 2.22 5.00 5.29 3.82 3.07 
93 Saudi_Arabia 0.00 2.36 1.11 4.38 1.76 1.92 1.93 
94 Senegal 7.00 5.00 3.33 5.63 5.88 5.37 6.21 
95 Singapore 4.33 7.50 2.78 7.50 7.35 5.89 6.38 
96 Sierra_Leone 5.25 2.21 2.22 3.75 4.41 3.57 4.55 
97 El_Salvador 9.17 5.43 3.89 4.38 8.24 6.22 6.64 
98 Sweden 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.38 10.00 9.88 9.39 
99 Swaziland 1.75 2.86 2.22 3.13 4.71 2.93 3.03 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 0.00 1.79 1.67 6.88 1.47 2.36 1.43 
101 Chad 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 3.24 1.65 1.50 
102 Togo 0.00 0.79 0.56 5.63 1.76 1.75 3.32 
103 Thailand 4.83 6.43 5.00 5.63 6.47 5.67 4.92 
104 Trinid&Tobago 9.17 6.79 6.11 5.63 8.24 7.18 7.10 
105 Tunisia 0.00 2.36 2.22 6.88 3.82 3.06 6.40 
106 Turkey 7.92 6.79 4.44 3.75 5.59 5.70 5.04 
107 Tanzania 6.00 3.93 5.06 5.63 5.29 5.18 5.76 
108 Uganda 4.33 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.76 5.14 5.26 
109 Uruguay 10.00 8.21 5.00 6.88 9.71 7.96 8.17 
110 U.S.A. 8.75 7.86 7.22 8.75 8.53 8.22 7.98 
111 Venezuela_RB 7.00 3.64 5.56 5.00 5.88 5.42 4.68 
112 Vietnam 0.83 4.29 2.78 4.38 1.47 2.75 3.38 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2.67 2.71 2.78 4.38 2.35 2.98 2.07 
114 South_Africa 8.75 7.86 7.22 6.88 8.82 7.91 7.41 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35 2.76 1.93 
116 Zambia 5.25 4.64 3.33 6.25 6.76 5.25 5.99 
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Table-A-2. Corruption Perception Index, Human Development Index, Per Capita Income, Social Progress Index, 
Democracy Index and Overall Globalization Index in the Countries under Study 
SL# Country Corruption 
Perception 
Human 
Development 
PC 
Income 
Social 
Progress 
Democracy 
Index 
Overall Globalization Index 
(AEMC) 
CP06 CP16 HD06 HD15 PCY06 SP16 DI06 DI16 GI (Min) GI (Max) 
1 Albania 26 39 7.03 7.64 4.90 69.79 5.91 59.10 50.86 61.61 
2 Argentina 29 36 7.88 8.27 13.70 75.20 6.63 69.60 57.09 59.19 
3 Australia 87 79 9.18 9.39 32.00 89.13 9.09 90.10 82.24 84.03 
4 Austria 86 75 8.60 8.93 32.90 86.60 8.69 84.10 91.36 93.95 
5 Azerbaijan 24 30 7.08 7.59 4.70 63.76 3.31 26.50 52.78 54.69 
6 Burundi 24 20 3.09 4.04 0.60 37.33 4.51 24.00 26.92 34.79 
7 Belgium 73 77 8.71 8.96 31.90 86.19 8.15 77.70 92.32 93.75 
8 Benin 25 36 4.38 4.85 1.10 50.03 6.16 56.70 41.61 48.99 
9 Burkina_Faso 32 42 3.34 4.02 1.20 49.34 3.72 47.00 41.27 49.12 
10 Bulgaria 40 41 7.55 7.94 9.00 72.14 7.10 70.10 69.36 76.34 
11 Bolivia 27 33 6.26 6.74 2.70 64.74 5.98 56.30 53.62 56.38 
12 Brazil 33 40 7.00 7.54 8.40 71.70 7.38 69.00 55.59 58.16 
13 Bhutan 60 65 5.50 6.07 1.40 65.65 2.62 49.30 35.44 47.07 
14 Botswana 56 60 6.30 6.98 10.00 67.04 7.60 78.70 49.05 60.64 
15 C._Afr_Rep 24 20 3.30 3.52 1.10 30.03 1.61 16.10 34.45 37.27 
16 Canada 85 82 8.94 9.20 32.90 89.50 9.07 91.50 86.39 87.51 
17 Switzerland 91 86 9.11 9.39 35.30 88.87 9.02 90.90 91.37 93.18 
18 Chile 73 66 7.97 8.47 11.30 82.12 7.89 77.80 69.54 72.77 
19 China 33 40 6.59 7.38 6.30 62.11 2.97 31.40 55.12 56.85 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 21 34 4.18 4.74 1.50 48.97 3.38 38.10 48.82 53.08 
21 Cameroon 23 26 4.56 5.18 1.90 47.22 3.27 34.60 40.16 42.75 
22 Congo_Rep. 22 20 5.17 5.92 0.70 49.74 2.76 29.10 47.78 57.31 
23 Colombia 39 37 6.75 7.27 7.10 70.84 6.40 66.70 54.44 58.23 
24 Costa_Rica 41 58 7.34 7.76 10.10 80.12 8.04 78.80 61.03 63.45 
25 Cyprus 56 55 8.36 8.56 20.30 80.75 7.60 76.50 78.44 89.36 
26 Germany 80 81 8.98 9.26 29.80 86.42 8.82 86.30 85.16 87.44 
27 Denmark 95 90 9.04 9.25 33.40 89.40 9.52 92.00 88.85 91.90 
28 Domin_Rep 28 31 6.85 7.22 6.60 65.66 6.13 66.70 55.44 67.20 
29 Algeria 31 34 6.90 7.45 7.20 61.19 3.17 35.60 42.36 53.32 
30 Ecuador 23 31 6.96 7.39 3.90 69.57 5.64 58.10 51.64 56.77 
31 Egypt 33 34 6.44 6.91 4.40 60.75 3.90 33.10 53.67 59.62 
32 Spain 68 58 8.49 8.84 25.20 85.88 8.34 83.00 84.60 86.71 
33 Ethiopia 24 34 3.62 4.48 0.80 43.50 4.72 36.00 37.47 39.87 
34 Finland 96 89 8.73 8.95 30.60 90.10 9.25 90.30 85.04 87.36 
35 Fiji 40 40 6.98 7.36 6.10 66.50 5.66 56.40 57.81 61.30 
36 France 74 69 8.73 8.97 30.00 84.79 8.07 79.20 87.32 89.36 
37 Gabon 30 35 6.45 6.97 5.80 60.22 2.72 37.40 51.79 59.46 
38 U.K. 86 81 8.89 9.10 30.90 88.58 8.08 83.60 88.15 89.91 
39 Ghana 33 43 5.19 5.79 2.40 60.38 5.35 67.50 50.64 55.67 
40 Guinea 19 27 3.64 4.14 2.20 41.66 2.02 31.40 40.45 46.82 
41 Gambia 25 26 4.20 4.52 1.80 50.30 4.39 29.10 51.12 54.92 
42 Greece 44 44 8.55 8.66 22.80 78.27 8.13 72.30 80.21 83.44 
43 Guatemala 26 28 5.78 6.40 5.20 61.69 6.07 59.20 56.59 57.71 
44 Guyana 25 34 6.20 6.38 3.80 60.00 6.15 62.50 49.78 59.99 
45 Honduras 25 30 5.90 6.25 2.80 60.65 6.25 59.20 57.05 60.57 
46 Haiti 18 20 4.58 4.93 1.60 43.15 4.19 40.20 34.53 38.47 
47 Hungary 52 48 8.09 8.36 16.10 76.88 7.53 67.20 86.30 87.02 
48 Indonesia 24 37 6.38 6.89 3.70 62.28 6.41 69.70 54.53 57.96 
49 India 33 40 5.46 6.24 3.40 53.92 7.68 78.10 47.98 50.87 
50 Ireland 74 73 9.02 9.23 34.10 87.94 9.01 91.50 89.89 95.20 
51 Iceland 96 78 8.87 9.21 34.90 88.45 9.71 95.00 71.77 81.39 
52 Israel 59 64 8.72 8.99 22.30 75.32 7.28 78.50 75.13 80.79 
53 Italy 49 47 8.62 8.87 28.40 82.49 7.73 79.80 81.77 83.57 
54 Jamaica 37 39 7.14 7.30 4.20 71.94 7.34 73.90 62.05 66.57 
55 Jordan 53 48 7.36 7.42 4.80 65.44 3.92 39.60 69.18 73.94 
56 Japan 76 72 8.77 9.03 30.70 86.54 8.15 79.90 65.61 68.81 
57 Kenya 22 26 4.94 5.55 1.20 53.72 5.08 53.30 42.55 45.80 
58 Cambodia 21 21 4.95 5.63 2.20 54.29 4.77 42.70 49.02 54.22 
59 South_Korea 51 53 8.67 9.01 20.40 80.92 7.88 79.20 61.36 66.05 
60 Kuwait 48 41 7.87 8.00 22.80 71.84 3.09 38.50 67.03 72.18 
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61 Lebanon 36 28 7.31 7.63 5.30 64.43 5.82 48.60 67.36 74.20 
62 Lesotho 32 39 4.40 4.97 3.00 52.39 6.48 65.90 36.96 48.77 
63 Luxembourg 86 81 8.77 8.98 55.60 91.00 9.10 88.10 83.89 89.59 
64 Morocco 32 37 5.81 6.47 4.30 61.93 3.90 47.70 56.51 64.33 
65 Moldova 32 30 6.56 6.99 2.10 64.74 6.50 60.10 58.36 61.70 
66 Madagascar 31 26 4.83 5.12 0.90 45.91 5.82 50.70 39.25 42.98 
67 Mexico 33 30 7.31 7.62 10.10 70.03 6.67 64.70 57.99 61.61 
68 Mali 28 32 3.63 4.42 1.00 46.24 5.99 57.00 44.06 46.72 
69 Malta 64 55 8.08 8.56 19.00 84.60 8.39 83.90 76.39 78.24 
70 Myanmar 19 28 4.84 5.56 1.60 49.84 1.77 42.00 32.04 38.40 
71 Montenegro 28 45 7.62 8.07 2.70 68.17 6.57 57.20 56.97 66.92 
72 Mongolia 28 38 6.61 7.35 2.20 62.81 6.60 66.20 46.41 55.63 
73 Mauritania 31 27 4.75 5.13 2.00 46.08 3.12 39.60 43.65 52.55 
74 Mauritius 51 54 7.20 7.81 13.20 73.24 8.04 82.80 60.47 66.81 
75 Malawi 27 31 3.87 4.76 0.60 53.44 4.97 55.50 40.16 46.09 
76 Malaysia 50 49 7.36 7.89 10.40 70.08 5.98 65.40 79.14 81.07 
77 Niger 23 35 2.93 3.53 0.80 41.63 3.54 39.60 41.05 50.86 
78 Nigeria 22 28 4.77 5.27 1.00 46.49 3.52 45.00 48.17 52.53 
79 Nicaragua 26 26 6.01 6.45 2.40 63.04 5.68 48.10 51.57 53.56 
80 Netherlands 87 83 8.99 9.24 30.60 88.66 9.66 88.00 93.78 95.24 
81 Norway 88 85 9.34 9.49 42.40 88.70 9.55 99.30 85.24 86.83 
82 Nepal 25 29 4.86 5.58 1.50 57.41 3.42 48.60 34.44 36.70 
83 New_Zealand 96 90 8.91 9.15 24.20 88.46 9.01 92.60 78.48 80.12 
84 Pakistan 22 32 5.05 5.50 2.40 49.13 3.92 43.30 48.64 51.16 
85 Panama 31 38 7.43 7.88 7.10 73.02 7.35 71.30 65.63 67.56 
86 Peru 33 35 6.96 7.40 6.10 70.10 6.11 66.50 62.50 65.24 
87 Philippines 25 35 6.48 6.82 5.10 65.93 6.48 69.40 55.98 59.19 
88 Poland 37 62 8.08 8.55 12.70 79.76 7.30 68.30 76.61 79.32 
89 Portugal 66 62 7.97 8.43 18.60 83.88 8.16 78.60 83.54 88.21 
90 Paraguay 26 30 6.49 6.93 4.90 67.45 6.16 62.70 56.32 59.39 
91 Romania 31 48 7.66 8.02 8.40 72.24 7.06 66.20 64.99 73.36 
92 Rwanda 25 54 4.24 4.98 1.30 51.91 3.82 30.70 34.22 43.83 
93 Saudi_Arabia 33 46 7.73 8.47 12.90 66.31 1.92 19.30 66.57 69.75 
94 Senegal 33 45 4.25 4.94 1.70 55.65 5.37 62.10 51.75 54.59 
95 Singapore 94 84 8.73 9.25 29.90 82.19 5.89 63.80 87.04 91.52 
96 Sierra_Leone 22 30 3.57 4.20 0.90 44.22 3.57 45.50 36.81 48.29 
97 El_Salvador 40 36 6.57 6.80 5.10 66.37 6.22 66.40 59.25 64.02 
98 Sweden 92 88 8.95 9.13 29.80 88.80 9.88 93.90 89.13 91.73 
99 Swaziland 25 43 5.08 5.41 5.50 51.76 2.93 30.30 47.23 51.92 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 29 13 6.44 5.36 3.40 52.10 2.36 14.30 45.17 50.02 
101 Chad 20 20 3.06 3.96 1.80 36.38 1.65 15.00 39.14 41.70 
102 Togo 24 32 4.43 4.87 1.70 49.03 1.75 33.20 47.25 54.25 
103 Thailand 36 35 6.87 7.40 8.30 67.44 5.67 49.20 62.95 71.71 
104 Trinid&Tobago 32 35 7.60 7.80 12.90 69.00 7.18 71.00 59.84 65.62 
105 Tunisia 46 41 6.95 7.25 7.60 68.01 3.06 64.00 58.22 60.63 
106 Turkey 38 41 6.97 7.67 7.90 67.83 5.70 50.40 65.92 69.88 
107 Tanzania 29 32 4.57 5.31 0.70 49.99 5.18 57.60 34.91 37.42 
108 Uganda 27 25 4.42 4.93 1.70 50.69 5.14 52.60 42.80 45.69 
109 Uruguay 64 71 7.60 7.95 16.00 80.12 7.96 81.70 66.74 68.14 
110 U.S.A. 73 74 9.01 9.20 42.00 84.62 8.22 79.80 78.47 81.15 
111 Venezuela_RB 23 17 7.28 7.67 6.50 63.46 5.42 46.80 48.92 55.45 
112 Vietnam 26 33 6.25 6.83 3.00 63.47 2.75 33.80 42.59 54.98 
113 Yemen_Rep. 26 14 4.77 4.82 0.80 41.76 2.98 20.70 42.64 46.66 
114 South_Africa 46 45 6.12 6.66 12.10 67.61 7.91 74.10 64.93 67.54 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 20 21 3.70 4.35 0.80 46.23 2.76 19.30 24.95 42.31 
116 Zambia 26 38 4.92 5.79 0.90 50.00 5.25 59.90 46.41 54.04 
Sources: Wikipedia for Corruption Perception, Human Development, Per-capita Income (in Int$1000), Social Progress and Democracy 
Indices. For Overall Globalization Index, GI(Max) and GI(Min) based on AEMC principle, see Tables 3 and 4 below. 
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Table-A-3. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization in Different Countries 
[Source: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch] 
SL Country Year-H E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2009 56.57 73.00 52.55 73.90 2.42 80.69 61.60 61.61 
2 Argentina 2008 45.92 39.11 43.30 71.50 41.47 92.07 59.95 59.19 
3 Australia 2007 74.79 81.24 73.40 87.55 94.03 89.71 83.80 84.03 
4 Austria 2007 89.34 86.56 87.06 92.06 95.54 96.86 91.87 93.95 
5 Azerbaijan 2007 67.38 63.70 37.92 77.61 34.96 54.01 57.02 54.69 
6 Burundi 2014 23.53 33.37 21.02 37.22 3.10 62.17 35.04 34.79 
7 Belgium 2007 96.71 82.81 81.94 96.39 91.22 97.67 92.41 93.75 
8 Benin 2014 53.79 42.92 28.55 39.46 2.48 75.17 46.67 48.99 
9 Burkina_Faso 2014 59.67 46.84 19.43 44.62 2.17 76.88 48.69 49.12 
10 Bulgaria 2013 80.04 72.93 51.55 77.71 85.30 84.96 76.98 76.34 
11 Bolivia 2006 62.03 59.79 39.52 51.01 3.78 75.69 54.42 56.38 
12 Brazil 2014 51.77 52.82 24.46 70.50 39.58 94.30 61.40 58.16 
13 Bhutan 2014 60.64 56.77 46.83 45.54 6.87 38.85 43.58 47.07 
14 Botswana 2008 77.58 59.64 59.54 57.17 5.88 59.28 55.50 60.64 
15 C._Afr_Rep 2014 49.56 28.29 13.44 40.71 2.24 58.39 36.34 37.27 
16 Canada 2007 76.20 82.03 80.78 94.74 96.09 92.91 87.15 87.51 
17 Switzerland 2014 95.02 70.51 91.77 87.57 94.47 93.40 88.79 93.18 
18 Chile 2007 82.68 87.08 41.25 77.69 41.18 87.67 74.31 72.77 
19 China 2014 43.49 62.19 18.71 65.65 78.37 84.26 62.02 56.85 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 2007 63.35 40.17 41.85 52.15 2.85 70.72 49.83 53.08 
21 Cameroon 2014 44.96 38.31 16.91 52.02 2.24 73.16 44.20 42.75 
22 Congo_Rep. 2014 96.24 41.58 35.45 43.93 1.25 63.67 51.83 57.31 
23 Colombia 2013 58.32 57.38 33.46 69.69 38.12 79.65 60.15 58.23 
24 Costa_Rica 2007 64.79 73.30 60.37 78.75 45.65 58.63 63.66 63.45 
25 Cyprus 2008 93.50 84.06 88.10 95.69 93.84 78.36 87.32 89.36 
26 Germany 2007 81.36 84.49 76.35 87.52 92.57 92.43 86.48 87.44 
27 Denmark 2007 87.80 89.09 83.64 89.59 93.06 93.75 90.01 91.90 
28 Domin_Rep 2014 64.15 59.56 53.70 64.97 79.14 73.31 66.45 67.20 
29 Algeria 2006 55.36 52.55 32.39 64.92 1.93 80.65 54.00 53.32 
30 Ecuador 2006 55.97 46.00 36.82 65.37 38.22 79.01 57.39 56.77 
31 Egypt 2013 42.96 48.68 27.64 66.78 77.77 93.01 63.10 59.62 
32 Spain 2007 78.33 81.36 74.93 87.72 90.22 95.93 85.92 86.71 
33 Ethiopia 2014 24.93 28.39 19.32 33.17 2.85 82.51 39.33 39.87 
34 Finland 2007 85.16 87.39 72.07 90.60 91.67 91.64 87.22 87.36 
35 Fiji 2014 74.43 25.70 56.98 57.20 43.56 69.68 57.56 61.30 
36 France 2007 76.99 87.19 80.56 88.36 91.79 97.96 88.23 89.36 
37 Gabon 2014 75.55 42.75 52.22 63.44 2.36 72.30 55.96 59.46 
38 U.K. 2006 81.91 89.75 79.57 90.54 93.30 94.90 89.06 89.91 
39 Ghana 2014 62.30 54.48 27.85 45.77 3.96 85.72 54.17 55.67 
40 Guinea 2014 57.21 31.29 21.72 41.38 2.73 76.19 44.40 46.82 
41 Gambia  2006 70.76 49.68 45.63 57.79 6.31 61.86 51.78 54.92 
42 Greece 2007 68.15 83.53 76.51 83.41 85.44 92.38 82.59 83.44 
43 Guatemala 2014 48.00 74.96 26.23 57.23 42.95 83.01 60.42 57.71 
44 Guyana 2006 80.52 62.07 56.43 55.51 44.10 43.34 56.44 59.99 
45 Honduras 2014 74.61 71.19 28.45 58.46 39.51 71.84 61.42 60.57 
46 Haiti 2010 34.21 62.93 28.71 50.84 1.00 45.88 39.36 38.47 
47 Hungary 2009 92.14 85.86 65.93 89.31 89.62 91.47 86.99 87.02 
48 Indonesia 2014 56.25 71.79 20.40 49.92 33.89 86.83 59.65 57.96 
49 India 2014 43.78 44.93 14.10 45.12 32.98 91.23 52.38 50.87 
50 Ireland 2014 99.52 89.78 89.37 91.72 91.88 90.47 92.15 95.20 
51 Iceland 2008 89.32 64.89 81.47 80.36 91.88 70.11 77.86 81.39 
52 Israel 2010 71.59 83.51 75.06 67.25 90.37 80.29 78.15 80.79 
53 Italy 2007 68.17 83.24 70.46 78.72 86.52 97.92 82.85 83.57 
54 Jamaica 2007 80.64 70.00 63.13 69.52 7.11 68.56 62.72 66.57 
55 Jordan 2006 79.36 59.47 67.97 71.54 41.11 84.27 70.31 73.94 
56 Japan 2014 50.41 76.54 43.39 75.59 87.91 88.10 72.26 68.81 
57 Kenya 2007 27.19 46.79 29.61 46.02 3.72 82.92 46.46 45.80 
58 Cambodia 2014 85.86 50.76 29.52 48.48 1.31 62.36 50.69 54.22 
59 South_Korea  2014 62.52 63.76 43.81 73.55 42.42 89.58 67.03 66.05 
60 Kuwait 2008 61.31 75.01 78.96 76.28 90.41 59.54 70.76 72.18 
61 Lebanon 2006 86.92 62.30 70.38 81.04 43.26 74.55 70.50 74.20 
62 Lesotho 2014 80.48 41.22 25.58 48.74 6.87 54.09 45.94 48.77 
63 Luxembourg 2007 100.00 88.46 96.09 97.51 48.25 80.06 85.62 89.59 
64 Morocco 2014 60.71 53.68 45.87 83.86 37.71 89.50 65.95 64.33 
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65 Moldova 2007 67.96 69.67 44.90 84.17 39.27 67.22 64.04 61.70 
66 Madagascar 2014 62.47 36.71 11.21 48.02 2.73 65.10 42.90 42.98 
67 Mexico 2014 63.45 68.45 44.30 68.92 40.12 71.72 62.29 61.61 
68 Mali 2014 50.97 41.67 22.46 44.10 1.12 75.98 46.07 46.72 
69 Malta 2009 99.76 87.06 83.18 96.04 49.74 52.58 76.16 78.24 
70 Myanmar 2014 56.93 56.33 11.89 42.07 1.00 44.74 39.03 38.40 
71 Montenegro 2010 81.65 79.55 72.69 94.41 5.08 56.33 65.48 66.92 
72 Mongolia 2014 84.88 65.73 16.76 59.40 1.43 71.89 56.91 55.63 
73 Mauritania 2014 79.30 58.16 19.77 51.82 1.37 66.99 51.45 52.55 
74 Mauritius 2014 91.12 84.89 58.78 82.06 42.61 45.32 66.61 66.81 
75 Malawi 2013 49.90 52.47 26.25 41.95 6.99 64.35 45.40 46.09 
76 Malaysia 2010 89.03 69.62 64.71 75.92 87.52 83.17 79.12 81.07 
77 Niger 2014 54.67 50.44 32.41 35.30 1.74 74.33 47.92 50.86 
78 Nigeria 2009 65.10 47.51 12.39 52.93 3.47 89.37 54.36 52.53 
79 Nicaragua 2012 61.15 61.69 34.97 56.57 40.24 57.38 53.99 53.56 
80 Netherlands 2014 97.64 88.48 85.98 93.26 92.75 95.41 92.84 95.24 
81 Norway 2013 80.32 72.93 81.74 85.52 91.68 92.27 84.48 86.83 
82 Nepal 2013 13.26 39.95 24.97 44.85 2.79 70.69 38.18 36.70 
83 New_Zealand 2008 76.62 90.04 79.32 91.46 50.44 80.05 79.17 80.12 
84 Pakistan 2007 40.85 43.25 23.40 44.12 32.38 87.55 51.83 51.16 
85 Panama 2009 89.59 71.32 50.84 81.17 47.74 60.74 67.70 67.56 
86 Peru 2011 69.02 82.53 32.33 58.27 36.87 84.74 66.14 65.24 
87 Philippines 2006 65.22 52.73 30.26 49.70 39.96 81.96 58.39 59.19 
88 Poland 2014 77.73 76.38 57.40 92.23 89.22 88.82 81.32 79.32 
89 Portugal 2007 82.71 87.10 76.48 91.10 88.73 93.85 87.61 88.21 
90 Paraguay 2012 62.44 56.59 36.33 65.09 39.86 77.61 60.13 59.39 
91 Romania 2014 60.67 83.22 48.07 82.02 82.39 89.82 76.51 73.36 
92 Rwanda 2014 34.81 63.91 17.27 39.87 7.05 71.53 45.56 43.83 
93 Saudi_Arabia 2009 62.95 76.19 69.00 71.18 83.25 60.43 68.43 69.75 
94 Senegal 2012 57.58 47.32 29.33 58.91 3.53 87.90 54.64 54.59 
95 Singapore 2009 99.01 95.35 92.18 88.25 96.12 71.77 88.27 91.52 
96 Sierra_Leone 2011 69.70 46.89 19.84 38.92 3.16 65.10 45.90 48.29 
97 El_Salvador 2007 61.06 72.79 49.35 64.68 40.80 75.40 63.79 64.02 
98 Sweden 2007 88.33 86.26 80.84 84.38 94.73 96.03 89.41 91.73 
99 Swaziland 2014 77.83 43.61 59.31 60.20 6.37 36.55 47.48 51.92 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2011 53.48 55.43 51.94 65.49 1.00 52.73 48.93 50.02 
101 Chad 2006 55.49 27.21 23.94 32.35 2.91 60.04 38.37 41.70 
102 Togo 2014 78.62 46.54 25.04 57.99 3.72 73.38 53.70 54.25 
103 Thailand 2012 83.87 59.54 42.90 72.93 80.93 81.22 72.06 71.71 
104 Trinid&Tobago 2012 86.13 68.86 58.65 67.24 41.73 53.54 63.09 65.62 
105 Tunisia 2008 70.83 48.71 41.68 76.78 2.67 86.29 60.45 60.63 
106 Turkey 2014 51.09 66.13 50.76 72.49 81.59 91.88 71.33 69.88 
107 Tanzania 2007 35.61 53.20 16.78 31.93 3.04 55.74 37.71 37.42 
108 Uganda 2013 44.01 58.02 21.59 37.01 4.52 70.23 45.48 45.69 
109 Uruguay 2008 65.66 68.87 51.35 65.92 42.10 85.45 67.23 68.14 
110 U.S.A. 2007 65.17 85.34 67.13 82.45 91.90 92.10 81.80 81.15 
111 Venezuela_RB 2006 62.32 47.83 38.48 68.43 41.65 65.68 56.17 55.45 
112 Vietnam 2014 80.26 49.28 16.43 63.78 31.92 71.13 56.69 54.98 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2008 53.37 63.83 23.57 41.91 1.68 62.24 46.51 46.66 
114 South_Africa 2014 72.64 65.18 41.53 61.39 41.93 88.04 66.72 67.54 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2013 69.13 37.26 6.23 43.38 1.00 62.03 41.67 42.31 
116 Zambia 2007 64.24 63.96 27.92 45.69 4.09 73.93 52.96 54.04 
E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-H when the overall index AEMC attained maximum (Gmax) during 2006-2014. 
AEMC Indices are computed by the author. 
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Table-A-4. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization in Different Countries 
[Source: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch] 
SL Country Year-L E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2006 35.89 58.68 52.56 69.39 2.24 67.63 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 2012 41.13 30.68 43.54 72.69 40.54 92.83 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 2013 68.41 78.01 73.79 85.80 92.90 90.42 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 2013 85.52 76.50 86.51 91.31 95.46 96.36 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 2009 59.96 57.99 38.90 78.95 34.51 55.51 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 2006 24.06 35.17 16.96 35.39 4.15 36.97 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 2013 95.51 73.19 84.04 96.99 91.01 96.51 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 2006 28.32 40.26 28.88 35.40 2.54 71.83 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 2006 16.39 50.78 32.95 36.90 3.90 71.57 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 2010 71.76 74.41 50.21 82.83 40.81 83.13 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 2011 56.44 50.56 37.79 58.44 2.91 76.81 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 2008 48.27 53.34 20.26 68.50 38.23 92.27 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 2007 34.97 56.40 46.37 41.28 5.32 21.18 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 2012 60.07 53.50 56.45 55.16 4.95 39.77 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 2007 40.14 22.02 15.27 32.43 2.24 57.98 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 2013 74.03 77.68 81.23 92.24 94.97 92.94 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 2011 94.70 60.22 91.35 89.06 94.96 92.44 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 2013 77.71 75.92 38.21 76.16 40.69 88.74 71.11 69.54 
19 China 2012 41.21 56.27 16.75 65.54 78.02 84.80 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 2013 56.86 36.44 29.24 53.69 2.61 74.19 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 2010 35.79 41.44 16.83 51.95 2.73 70.25 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 2008 91.35 37.23 31.94 40.90 1.74 39.88 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 2008 54.98 42.87 30.73 70.80 38.22 78.48 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 2013 62.90 66.25 55.31 81.31 45.89 59.43 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 2006 91.53 84.62 86.55 95.34 47.57 59.05 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 2013 75.94 73.34 79.32 85.40 92.01 91.93 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 2013 84.52 80.70 81.47 88.35 93.53 91.65 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 2009 54.07 57.06 53.37 67.39 36.62 56.88 55.00 55.44 
29 Algeria 2007 49.62 47.76 33.94 64.81 2.05 48.49 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 2014 40.55 36.53 34.14 62.25 38.21 80.97 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 2012 41.62 46.07 22.45 66.66 35.94 93.45 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 2013 75.24 74.68 73.88 86.21 89.60 95.51 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 2011 28.98 21.94 10.54 29.29 2.17 81.88 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 2009 77.81 86.19 72.26 88.86 91.36 90.25 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 2009 64.73 25.64 56.01 50.18 43.87 66.56 53.75 57.81 
36 France 2013 73.58 78.12 81.13 89.14 92.48 97.29 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 2011 75.77 31.78 51.97 61.25 2.36 51.11 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 2014 80.71 85.27 76.35 87.66 93.64 94.67 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 2008 36.37 51.83 35.82 43.80 4.52 83.98 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 2010 35.70 31.29 21.36 39.92 4.15 71.90 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  2009 50.86 50.47 45.99 61.95 5.38 64.80 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 2012 61.28 77.37 75.14 84.24 84.42 91.33 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 2010 46.46 68.40 27.08 56.03 43.98 82.47 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 2013 61.74 58.98 48.79 58.06 5.76 44.66 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 2010 63.36 65.10 30.16 60.23 39.72 70.29 58.38 57.05 
46 Haiti 2014 35.21 68.47 6.41 51.82 1.00 48.28 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 2011 91.22 81.45 66.67 89.18 90.33 90.93 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 2008 49.64 69.02 17.85 47.95 33.79 84.05 56.64 54.53 
49 India 2006 35.28 43.76 13.64 46.46 32.53 89.37 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 2008 97.80 88.49 91.12 92.11 48.10 87.41 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 2013 89.48 59.80 80.56 78.37 50.11 54.09 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 2011 69.88 76.98 75.38 66.87 90.37 65.01 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 2013 64.98 75.44 70.42 78.44 88.21 97.52 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 2014 73.94 51.72 57.00 67.13 6.93 72.58 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 2013 72.22 61.91 52.07 69.51 42.37 86.09 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 2011 43.92 65.57 42.19 76.22 87.85 88.66 69.25 65.61 
57 Kenya 2012 25.69 44.87 19.21 48.47 3.59 82.94 45.16 42.55 
58 Cambodia 2011 70.40 50.86 26.14 44.44 2.17 59.93 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  2006 54.55 65.58 39.06 76.10 41.38 83.59 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 2013 53.45 65.47 70.68 73.63 89.69 60.31 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 2011 77.07 56.80 70.26 90.02 45.95 60.76 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 2006 59.43 37.57 24.70 45.45 6.68 33.39 35.69 36.96 
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63 Luxembourg 2006 99.72 87.43 96.37 96.87 48.06 60.97 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 2006 49.22 40.66 35.46 67.40 37.20 87.73 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 2014 60.52 63.40 40.67 84.06 37.77 69.00 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 2011 56.71 28.24 8.15 49.42 2.67 63.64 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 2008 55.23 60.32 42.67 70.30 41.09 70.95 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 2007 44.08 41.64 20.96 36.32 2.17 73.60 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 2006 97.19 87.13 83.62 96.07 50.17 47.77 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 2009 47.20 49.84 9.82 27.94 1.00 36.00 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 2006 52.52 76.75 73.23 94.86 6.25 46.57 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 2006 54.54 60.02 19.54 57.15 2.05 65.31 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 2006 72.75 40.60 25.64 43.51 1.37 45.02 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 2006 57.62 70.87 59.49 85.06 40.57 57.79 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 2009 32.32 44.30 27.07 39.17 6.74 61.73 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 2014 88.91 66.95 57.96 77.28 87.65 83.69 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 2007 24.17 37.19 32.59 30.52 1.68 71.94 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 2014 46.48 52.49 9.46 46.64 1.43 90.79 50.24 48.17 
79 Nicaragua 2008 53.72 63.14 35.68 56.50 39.11 55.74 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 2009 95.28 88.51 84.91 90.53 92.90 93.23 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 2006 81.16 70.67 79.65 83.91 91.99 88.88 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 2008 11.40 31.69 25.16 37.96 3.35 68.10 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 2013 72.83 85.72 78.84 89.57 50.42 80.03 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 2014 33.87 45.27 19.22 48.01 32.32 87.30 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 2006 91.07 65.78 50.23 73.96 47.74 56.13 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 2006 66.78 67.15 32.70 54.46 37.01 84.09 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 2014 58.47 49.32 24.22 54.23 41.28 82.83 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 2011 72.22 68.03 56.29 91.86 87.36 89.58 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 2013 79.89 82.09 68.63 91.19 89.70 88.98 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 2008 53.18 57.92 36.26 60.83 37.09 75.13 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 2006 60.44 60.73 44.18 78.72 38.69 89.91 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 2006 19.54 34.11 23.81 38.03 4.27 60.31 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 2006 52.82 76.19 70.24 69.12 82.06 57.24 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 2006 40.99 38.14 40.60 58.22 4.09 86.13 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 2014 99.01 96.53 93.20 85.75 96.53 54.77 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 2009 30.15 41.28 19.63 33.56 3.22 61.16 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 2011 57.17 63.11 35.53 66.64 41.19 78.63 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 2013 85.48 75.35 81.30 81.02 93.46 94.65 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 2007 63.20 36.36 61.97 54.71 6.37 33.68 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2007 49.06 38.95 43.38 63.66 1.00 54.93 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 2011 50.22 28.12 19.94 36.74 2.91 58.55 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 2008 53.50 37.49 28.74 54.91 3.53 71.19 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 2008 74.06 55.41 39.67 68.67 37.94 78.48 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 2007 79.71 71.95 61.64 66.92 5.76 47.01 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 2011 68.94 42.49 40.06 78.34 2.48 83.92 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 2006 46.77 69.54 40.93 72.69 78.12 89.96 69.07 65.92 
107 Tanzania 2006 27.06 50.59 17.16 33.54 2.61 55.17 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 2006 35.99 52.16 24.19 35.24 3.53 67.77 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 2012 60.28 67.75 52.98 69.97 42.11 84.09 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 2009 59.05 78.48 66.91 81.46 91.77 91.43 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 2010 40.82 37.04 38.46 70.34 40.30 66.51 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 2006 70.58 39.35 17.13 59.33 3.04 50.33 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2014 35.99 54.18 26.38 44.10 1.12 65.01 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 2011 67.26 63.98 39.51 61.09 40.86 86.20 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2006 19.87 28.69 8.76 34.02 1.00 44.96 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 2012 50.36 55.83 16.51 43.66 3.78 73.04 47.36 46.41 
E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-L when the overall index AEMC attained minimum (Gmin) during 2006-2014. 
AEMC Indices are computed by the author. 
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Table-A-5. Coefficients of the Reduced Form Equation with their Standard Error of Estimate (SEE): Pessimistic Scenario  
Endo- 
genous 
Exogenous / Predetermine Variables (Predictors at 2-SLS Stage-1) 
Constant R
2
 
EPP06 FOG06 PPN06 PCL06 CVL06 CP06 HD06 PCY06 DI06 
E1  0.0353 -0.0880 -0.0779 -0.2510 -0.3210 0.2066 0.7242 0.0561 0.4427 1.0808 0.5649 
 (SEE) 0.0351 0.0590 0.0706 0.1780 0.1642 0.1192 0.2361 0.0645 0.3166 0.8970  
            
E2  0.0093 0.0414 -0.1017 -0.1346 -0.1563 0.1731 0.5338 -0.0120 0.4174 0.9137 0.6268 
 SEE 0.0263 0.0443 0.0529 0.1335 0.1231 0.0894 0.1771 0.0484 0.2374 0.6728  
            
 S1  0.0538 -0.0133 0.0376 0.2887 0.5016 0.3852 0.6971 0.1551 -0.9627 -0.9281 0.6954 
(SEE) 0.0440 0.0742 0.0887 0.2236 0.2063 0.1498 0.2967 0.0810 0.3978 1.1271  
            
 S2  0.0039 -0.0384 0.0397 0.0642 0.0830 -0.0389 0.7784 0.0656 -0.1078 0.5895 0.8359 
(SEE) 0.0171 0.0287 0.0343 0.0866 0.0799 0.0580 0.1149 0.0314 0.1540 0.4363  
            
 S3  0.0452 0.0456 -0.3037 -0.8856 -0.2577 0.0937 0.8872 0.7382 1.3123 -4.0018 0.7214 
(SEE) 0.1046 0.1761 0.2107 0.5311 0.4899 0.3558 0.7047 0.1925 0.9447 2.6769  
            
 P  -0.0140 -0.0413 0.0590 0.1266 0.0154 -0.1374 -0.1605 0.0990 0.2297 3.5050 0.2545 
(SEE) 0.0317 0.0533 0.0638 0.1607 0.1483 0.1077 0.2133 0.0582 0.2859 0.8101  
            
 DI16  -0.0383 0.1010 -0.0229 0.0314 0.2141 0.0861 0.0778 -0.0198 0.5551 0.0727 0.8427 
(SEE) 0.0220 0.0370 0.0443 0.1117 0.1030 0.0748 0.1482 0.0405 0.1987 0.5630  
            
 CP16  0.0026 0.0985 -0.0403 0.0812 0.1666 0.6498 -0.1923 0.0657 -0.1688 1.3076 0.8135 
(SEE) 0.0244 0.0410 0.0491 0.1237 0.1141 0.0829 0.1641 0.0448 0.2200 0.6233  
            
HD15  0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0162 0.0176 -0.0085 0.0002 0.8315 -0.0015 0.0510 -1.6935 0.9822 
(SEE) 0.0044 0.0075 0.0090 0.0226 0.0208 0.0151 0.0300 0.0082 0.0402 0.1138  
            
GI10  0.0138 -0.0258 -0.0116 -0.0043 -0.0235 0.1206 0.3406 0.0936 0.0985 1.6204 0.8527 
(SEE) 0.0149 0.0251 0.0300 0.0756 0.0697 0.0507 0.1003 0.0274 0.1345 0.3810  
            
SP16  -0.0103 0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0005 0.0125 0.0715 0.4939 0.0169 0.1301 1.2664 0.9420 
(SEE) 0.0075 0.0127 0.0151 0.0382 0.0352 0.0256 0.0507 0.0138 0.0679 0.1924  
 
. 
Table-A-6. Coefficients of the Reduced Form Equation with their Standard Error of Estimate (SEE):  Optimistic Scenario  
Endo- 
genous 
Exogenous / Predetermine Variables (Predictors at 2-SLS Stage-1) 
Constant R
2
 
EPP06 FOG06 PPN06 PCL06 CVL06 CP06 HD06 PCY06 DI06 
E1  0.0720 -0.1249 -0.0406 -0.2353 -0.3101 0.2985 0.4259 0.0228 0.2710 2.7392 
0.4213 
 (SEE) 0.0317 0.0534 0.0639 0.1611 0.1486 0.1079 0.2138 0.0584 0.2866 0.8120  
                      
E2  0.0055 0.0438 -0.0611 -0.1000 -0.0985 0.1624 0.5962 -0.0295 0.2559 0.9869 
0.6512 
 SEE 0.0231 0.0389 0.0466 0.1174 0.1083 0.0786 0.1557 0.0425 0.2088 0.5916  
                      
 S1  0.0331 0.0119 -0.0114 0.2058 0.4477 0.2694 0.8125 0.1278 -0.7073 -1.1285 
0.7051 
(SEE) 0.0407 0.0686 0.0821 0.2069 0.1908 0.1386 0.2745 0.0750 0.3680 1.0427  
             
 S2  0.0051 -0.0192 0.0634 0.0511 0.0611 0.0081 0.6361 0.0736 -0.1898 1.3097 
0.8366 
(SEE) 0.0154 0.0260 0.0311 0.0783 0.0723 0.0525 0.1040 0.0284 0.1394 0.3949  
             
 S3  0.0601 0.0847 -0.3366 -1.0896 -0.5415 -0.1104 1.3049 0.7577 1.5880 -4.1574 
0.7269 
(SEE) 0.1062 0.1789 0.2139 0.5394 0.4975 0.3614 0.7157 0.1955 0.9594 2.7185  
            
 P  0.0164 -0.0399 0.0444 0.1394 -0.0656 -0.0102 -0.1109 0.0651 0.1193 3.7019 
0.2994 
(SEE) 0.0231 0.0389 0.0465 0.1173 0.1082 0.0786 0.1556 0.0425 0.2086 0.5912  
            
 DI16  -0.0383 0.1010 -0.0229 0.0314 0.2141 0.0861 0.0778 -0.0198 0.5551 0.0727 
0.8427 
(SEE) 0.0220 0.0370 0.0443 0.1117 0.1030 0.0748 0.1482 0.0405 0.1987 0.5630  
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 CP16  0.0026 0.0985 -0.0403 0.0812 0.1666 0.6498 -0.1923 0.0657 -0.1688 1.3076 0.8135 
(SEE) 0.0244 0.0410 0.0491 0.1237 0.1141 0.0829 0.1641 0.0448 0.2200 0.6233  
             
HD15  0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0162 0.0176 -0.0085 0.0002 0.8315 -0.0015 0.0510 -1.6935 0.9822 
(SEE) 0.0044 0.0075 0.0090 0.0226 0.0208 0.0151 0.0300 0.0082 0.0402 0.1138  
             
GI10  0.0332 -0.0379 -0.0074 0.0012 -0.0758 0.1441 0.3184 0.0739 0.0590 2.1082 
0.8716 
(SEE) 0.0118 0.0199 0.0238 0.0600 0.0553 0.0402 0.0796 0.0217 0.1066 0.3022  
             
SP16  -0.0103 0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0005 0.0125 0.0715 0.4939 0.0169 0.1301 1.2664 0.9420 
(SEE) 0.0075 0.0127 0.0151 0.0382 0.0352 0.0256 0.0507 0.0138 0.0679 0.1924  
. 
Table-A-7. Correlation between Observed, Expected (C-2-SLS) and (SV-2-SLS) for Pessimistic Globalization Scenario  
Variable E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 CP16 HD15 GI10 SP16 
Panel-1: Observed Response Variable and Expected Response Variable (Conventional 2-SLS or C-2-SLS) or ij, j ^) 
E1 0.731 0.760 0.790 0.896 0.821 0.376 0.678 0.759 0.970 0.904 0.951 
E2 0.701 0.792 0.754 0.853 0.811 0.403 0.790 0.788 0.944 0.889 0.952 
S1 0.700 0.732 0.824 0.863 0.806 0.388 0.690 0.829 0.915 0.904 0.930 
S2 0.712 0.740 0.782 0.913 0.807 0.396 0.676 0.708 0.982 0.893 0.950 
S3 0.703 0.760 0.783 0.883 0.831 0.430 0.771 0.770 0.944 0.905 0.953 
P 0.590 0.707 0.706 0.805 0.791 0.451 0.807 0.724 0.859 0.830 0.887 
DI16 0.551 0.708 0.628 0.693 0.712 0.463 0.884 0.759 0.761 0.780 0.836 
CP16 0.601 0.698 0.769 0.723 0.729 0.377 0.756 0.893 0.771 0.831 0.843 
HD15 0.724 0.737 0.782 0.914 0.801 0.389 0.653 0.700 0.983 0.893 0.946 
GI10 0.713 0.764 0.809 0.886 0.831 0.422 0.740 0.814 0.948 0.921 0.958 
SP16 0.709 0.778 0.787 0.894 0.820 0.417 0.767 0.780 0.973 0.908 0.970 
Panel-2: Observed Response Variable and Expected Response Variable (Shapley Value 2-SLS or SV-2-SLS) or ij, jb  
E1 0.709 0.762 0.813 0.875 0.812 0.411 0.730 0.832 0.941 0.916 0.953 
E2 0.695 0.766 0.783 0.879 0.822 0.446 0.794 0.786 0.943 0.908 0.957 
S1 0.701 0.778 0.796 0.867 0.820 0.427 0.787 0.832 0.938 0.914 0.959 
S2 0.695 0.774 0.783 0.882 0.819 0.441 0.795 0.793 0.954 0.909 0.965 
S3 0.671 0.748 0.778 0.850 0.788 0.453 0.784 0.819 0.911 0.897 0.941 
P 0.733 0.763 0.805 0.895 0.837 0.404 0.703 0.779 0.960 0.919 0.953 
DI16 0.692 0.765 0.780 0.876 0.831 0.456 0.798 0.784 0.938 0.909 0.954 
CP16 0.721 0.766 0.809 0.894 0.835 0.420 0.739 0.794 0.957 0.922 0.959 
HD15 0.738 0.757 0.792 0.902 0.832 0.397 0.682 0.740 0.970 0.911 0.949 
GI10 0.702 0.771 0.802 0.871 0.824 0.431 0.779 0.832 0.935 0.917 0.958 
SP16 0.698 0.771 0.803 0.872 0.828 0.431 0.784 0.830 0.936 0.916 0.958 
Panel-3: C-2-SLS based Expected Response Variable and SV-2-SLS,Expected Response Variable or ij^, jb  
E1 0.971 0.961 0.965 0.965 0.925 0.990 0.954 0.982 0.990 0.968 0.968 
E2 0.963 0.968 0.983 0.978 0.945 0.964 0.966 0.968 0.956 0.974 0.974 
S1 0.982 0.944 0.966 0.949 0.946 0.973 0.947 0.976 0.958 0.974 0.974 
S2 0.957 0.960 0.948 0.966 0.929 0.977 0.957 0.976 0.984 0.953 0.955 
S3 0.961 0.991 0.975 0.982 0.948 0.979 0.984 0.985 0.976 0.981 0.980 
P 0.889 0.925 0.911 0.933 0.904 0.895 0.944 0.909 0.881 0.916 0.929 
DI16 0.846 0.891 0.896 0.896 0.909 0.812 0.903 0.843 0.788 0.887 0.886 
CP16 0.922 0.880 0.927 0.885 0.907 0.870 0.878 0.890 0.829 0.923 0.923 
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HD15 0.955 0.956 0.944 0.960 0.925 0.977 0.951 0.974 0.987 0.948 0.947 
GI10 0.994 0.984 0.992 0.988 0.975 0.993 0.986 0.996 0.982 0.996 0.996 
SP16 0.982 0.986 0.989 0.994 0.967 0.983 0.983 0.990 0.979 0.987 0.988 
Note:  = Observed response variable; O = Expected response variable (C-2-SLS); k = Expected response variable (SV-2-SLS) 
. 
Table-A-8. Correlation between Original, Expected (C-2-SLS) and (SV-2-SLS) for Optimistic Globalization Scenario 
Variable E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 CP16 HD15 GI10 SP16 
Panel-1: Observed Response Variable and Expected Response Variable (Conventional 2-SLS or C-2-SLS) or ij, j ^) 
E1 0.579 0.748 0.797 0.867 0.784 0.392 0.613 0.783 0.913 0.888 0.907 
E2 0.540 0.806 0.781 0.861 0.807 0.436 0.776 0.775 0.958 0.888 0.958 
S1 0.555 0.767 0.831 0.878 0.813 0.440 0.716 0.812 0.942 0.912 0.949 
S2 0.541 0.761 0.799 0.913 0.815 0.431 0.654 0.709 0.977 0.895 0.944 
S3 0.575 0.776 0.794 0.894 0.827 0.452 0.716 0.732 0.962 0.910 0.947 
P 0.552 0.750 0.782 0.837 0.797 0.469 0.691 0.827 0.889 0.902 0.913 
DI16 0.469 0.725 0.674 0.686 0.715 0.480 0.862 0.791 0.777 0.801 0.845 
CP16 0.496 0.717 0.779 0.755 0.717 0.461 0.785 0.873 0.813 0.850 0.873 
HD15 0.548 0.765 0.810 0.913 0.820 0.433 0.665 0.727 0.976 0.902 0.948 
GI10 0.555 0.777 0.825 0.887 0.821 0.468 0.733 0.821 0.946 0.923 0.957 
SP16 0.536 0.796 0.810 0.889 0.821 0.455 0.767 0.780 0.973 0.906 0.970 
Panel-2: Observed Response Variable and Expected Response Variable (Shapley Value 2-SLS or SV-2-SLS) or ij, jb  
E1 0.547 0.776 0.822 0.876 0.800 0.469 0.732 0.836 0.938 0.917 0.952 
E2 0.554 0.782 0.800 0.880 0.815 0.489 0.774 0.792 0.943 0.917 0.955 
S1 0.556 0.790 0.809 0.864 0.814 0.482 0.787 0.828 0.935 0.919 0.956 
S2 0.528 0.789 0.803 0.882 0.815 0.481 0.788 0.791 0.956 0.907 0.965 
S3 0.538 0.762 0.793 0.856 0.774 0.504 0.756 0.822 0.916 0.908 0.940 
P 0.580 0.775 0.823 0.896 0.835 0.450 0.696 0.781 0.958 0.926 0.951 
DI16 0.556 0.784 0.810 0.885 0.826 0.485 0.765 0.794 0.953 0.923 0.961 
CP16 0.575 0.779 0.821 0.891 0.828 0.474 0.733 0.795 0.955 0.930 0.957 
HD15 0.600 0.764 0.806 0.894 0.830 0.441 0.657 0.739 0.957 0.921 0.936 
GI10 0.547 0.782 0.816 0.871 0.817 0.482 0.777 0.833 0.935 0.919 0.958 
SP16 0.543 0.783 0.819 0.871 0.821 0.478 0.781 0.831 0.937 0.918 0.958 
Panel-3: C-2-SLS based Expected Response Variable and SV-2-SLS,based Expected Response Variable or ij^, jb  
E1 0.945 0.929 0.933 0.916 0.900 0.964 0.930 0.949 0.960 0.940 0.936 
E2 0.961 0.970 0.979 0.978 0.944 0.961 0.972 0.967 0.949 0.970 0.971 
S1 0.985 0.960 0.974 0.966 0.953 0.985 0.973 0.982 0.966 0.983 0.983 
S2 0.954 0.961 0.943 0.966 0.933 0.978 0.969 0.972 0.975 0.951 0.951 
S3 0.949 0.984 0.967 0.973 0.937 0.983 0.982 0.984 0.987 0.965 0.964 
P 0.972 0.945 0.962 0.944 0.960 0.960 0.959 0.959 0.940 0.969 0.966 
DI16 0.868 0.888 0.919 0.891 0.893 0.832 0.887 0.865 0.803 0.901 0.900 
CP16 0.940 0.902 0.942 0.908 0.932 0.888 0.909 0.910 0.846 0.940 0.941 
HD15 0.961 0.967 0.952 0.970 0.937 0.985 0.974 0.979 0.981 0.959 0.960 
GI10 0.995 0.983 0.989 0.985 0.977 0.992 0.992 0.994 0.973 0.996 0.995 
SP16 0.981 0.983 0.986 0.994 0.966 0.981 0.990 0.987 0.965 0.986 0.988 
Note:  = Observed response variable; O = Expected response variable (C-2-SLS); k = Expected response variable (SV-2-SLS) 
 
